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Résumé 
Dans les derniers années, l'augmentation des demandeurs d'asile nord coréens en Corée 
du sud, a causé des soucis important au gouvernement sud coréen. Malgré que la présence 
de ces saetomins comprend moins que 1 % de la population totale de la Corée du sud, leur 
taux d'arrivée qui est devenu soudainement élevé. Ceci a eu pour effet de force le 
gouvernement du sud à révaluer leur programmes d'intégration pour les nord-coréens. Ce 
mémoire examine la relation entre le processus d'intégration des saetomins et l'évolution 
de l'identité national coréenne, vis-à-vis la Corée du nord. Les indicateurs utilisé pour 
determiner cette vue sont: les recueils des textes primaires sud coréens, les journaux et 
les symboles nationaux comme les monuments et la célébration de la journée de 
libération coréenne. L'étude démontre que l'image d'hostilité et d'agression des nord 
coréens s'est transformé pour en devenir une de pitié, qui ont besoin de l'assistance du 
sud comme guide et protecteur. 
Mots clés: Corée du nord, Corée du sud, demandeur d'asile, intégration, nationalisme 
Notes sur la transcription: Le système de transcription Revised Romanisation pour la 
langue coréenne est utilisé dans ce mémoire. Les noms les plus utilisés sont écrits dans 
leur forme la plus connues. 
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Abstract 
The increasing number of North Korean asylum seekers in South Korea in recent years 
has created a eause for concem for the Republic ofKorea. Although the saelomin account 
for Jess than 1 % of the total South Korean population, the rapid rate of increase in their 
arrivai has prompted the South Korean govemment to re-evaJuate its resettlement policy 
and support programs for the integration of these asylum seekers. For the purpose of this 
study, in which the correlation between the changing image of Korean national identity in 
South Korea is examined in relation to the integration process of saetomin, three tàctors 
are used to identify the South's views of its North Korean 'Other'. They include the 
image of North Koreans found in South Korean primary sehool textbooks, print news 
media and in national symbols such as memorials and the celebration of Korean 
Liberation Day. The study revealed that the image of North Koreans has changed from 
hostile enemies to one of pit y and empathy, requiring aid from the South to instruet, 
nourish and guide them. The South has assumed the role of the wiser, older sibling, 
whose dut y it is to proteet the saetomin who have sought refuge in the South. 
~...z..-:.-'-==' North Korea, South Korea, asylum seeker, integration, nationalism 
Notes on Romanisation: The Revised Romanisation system of Korean romanisation is 
used. However, well-known Korean names are given in their best known forms. 
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Introduction 
Since the mid-1990s, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) or 
North Korea l has been in a continuous state of social and economic deterioration. The 
death of thousands of its citizens caused by the onset of chronic famine, extreme flooding 
and economic implosion, has compelled this isolationist state into opening its tightly 
controlled borders to foreign aid (Williams 2002, 114). Despite contributions of food and 
supplies from various international organisations, inadequate provisions persist. 
Consequently, regardless of the risk ofpolitical persecution, the rising fear of starvation 
and malnutrition has, in recent years, led to an increasing exodus from North Korea. The 
sensitive nature in dealing with North Korean asylum seekers and the lack of openness 
regarding the issue results in a large margin of error in the estimation of their numbers. 
While the govemments of China, Russia and South Korea, which are directly affected by 
the exodus, try to show that the issue of North Korean asylum seekers is not a serious one 
by giving lower estimates of the North Korean exodus; non-governmental organisations 
working closely with the asylum seekers have much higher figures. The Chinese and 
South Korean governments have estimated 10 000 - 30 000 North Korean refugees in 
China, whereas various international organisations estimate between 100000 to 300 000 
(Koh and Oh 2004, 68). These North Koreans aspire to reach South Korea as their final 
destination, where they dream of establishing their new home. Despite their awareness of 
the need to adjust to the South's capitalist lifestyle, North Koreans assume that a shared 
language and culture with the South Koreans, will make integration less difficult. 
However, North Korean asylum seekers interviewed by Koh and Baek have felt 
discouraged upon realising that they would not be as welcomed and accepted in South 
1 The two Koreas are referred to as the Republic of Korea (ROK), South Korea and the South; and the 
Democratie People's Republic of Korea, North Korea or the North. 
\, 
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Korea, contrary to their beliefs. As with rnany others in their situation, they felt that 
adjustrnent to South Korean society was surprisingly difficult (Koh and Baek 2002, 205). 
Their challenges include: the managing of personal finances, access to adequate 
employrnent, and social prejudices and depression. 
Due to the lingering pain caused by the Korean War2 and the image of North 
Koreans, which they have created through information from the media and education in 
school, rnany South Koreans have developed a prejudice towards North Koreans. While 
the drearn of a united Korea remains, in reality, South Koreans have a fear and mistrust of 
North Koreans. How the South Korean people's desire for unification interacts with their 
prejudice towards North Korean asylurn seekers is a conflicting phenornenon, which 
hinders the integration of the North Koreans in the ROK. ft is this process that this thesis 
seeks to understand. 
Research Question and Hypothesis 
For over half a century, Koreans on both sides of the 38lh paraUel have been 
hoping for reunification, based on the belief that it is inevitable. Governments of both 
Koreas have produced advanced doctrine that the division of Korea is merely an artiticial 
barrier that does not affect the sense of fraternity between North and South Koreans. 
Despite this drean1 of a united Korea, governrnent policies on either side of the 
dernarcation line have until recently fostered antagonistic sentiments towards one another 
and in sorne cases have shown outright hostility. Following the end of the Cold War era, 
tensions between North and South Korea have eased and efforts have been made towards 
2 The Korean War officially began on June 25, 1950. Active battle ended on July 27, 1953, with the signing 
of an armistice requiring both North and South Korea to retreat 2km from the line of division (381h pal'allel), 
creating the Oemilitarised Zone (Eckert et al. 1990, 344-345 and Oberdorfer 1997, 10). 
3 
more amicable relations between the two Koreas. This is particularly true since 1997, 
when South Korean President Kim Dae Jung inaugurated his "Sunshine Policy", a 
platform that caBs for increased cooperation with North Korea in preparation for eventual 
peaceful unification. This policy was different from past South Korean policies since it 
focussed on cultural and economic exchanges rather than on ideological differences 
between the two nations, while at the same time instilling a sense of Korean solidarity. 
This research examines the process ofintegration of North Korean asylum seekers 
in South Korea through the ROK government's construction of the image of North Korea 
and its people. Such image influences how South Koreans perceive North Koreans. The 
analysis is conducted within the context of South Korea's definition of its own national 
identity, which, since division, has been defined in relation to its North Korean 
counterpart. Although the Korean peninsula is said to be one of the most ethnically 
homogeneous regions in the world, this uniformity appears to be lacking in its national 
sentiment, which is indicative in its absence of receptiveness towards recent North 
Korean migrants in South Korea. This thesis seeks to address the following question: 
Does the South Korean govemment's imagined Korean nation have an influence on the 
North Korean asylum seekers' integration process into the ROK soCiety? 
While officiaIs and scholars studying the unification prospects of the Korean 
peninsula have traditionally stated that the only factor dividing it is that of political 
ideology, this theory no longer holds true today. Although both North and South Koreans 
share a common heritage, over five decades of separation and isolation have led to the 
evolution of "new" Korean societies that go beyond political division. As a result, North 
Korean asylum seekers experience great difficulty adapting to South Korean main stream 
society. 
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The indicators used for measuring South Korean nationalism are: education, the 
South Korean media and national symbols. The government has had much influence with 
these three elements, and in sorne instances, has had control over its delivery to the 
general population. In South Korea, the national government is responsible for devising 
school curricula. The texts used in c1assrooms are generally printed and published by 
state- run establishments and its contents approved by the government that exercises 
considerable control over what is taught in schools. Consequently, a reflection of the 
state's ideology may more often th an not be found in the texts. The ROK government's 
reasoning is that in, "[r]ealizing that young children may grow up to be old patriots, [the] 
state has chosen a particular nationalist education for its young Koreans" (Hart 2000, 142). 
Since children spend most oftheir time in school, it can be assumed that values, beliefs 
and norms are largely acquired during this time. It can also be assumed that these values 
will influence their behaviour in society. 
As with its control over education, the South Korean government has an influence 
over the stories told in their newspapers and news broadcasts. Although government 
control subsided in 1987, 'suggestions' and comments made by politicalleaders still have 
much influence. The portrayal of the North Korean 'Other' by the South Korean media is 
largely an illustration of its government's policy, which is most often in relation to 
national security concerns. Previously, this generally entailed the North's threat ofusing 
nuc1ear weapons against the South; however, in recent years, the large numbers of North 
Korean asylum seekers have raised much concern. 
National symbols such as monuments and holidays are elements in which the 
government has sorne authority, as weIl. Monuments are often used to commemorate 
historie events. The way in which the se events are remembered by the general population 
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is, in part, influenced by the monuments attributed to them. Since the Korean War has had 
a significant impact on how the ROK govemment has chosen to redefine Korean national 
identity, the monuments used to remember the Korean War in South Korea, such as the 
display of the section on the War in Seoul's War Memorial, are also examined. 
These indicators are the source for defining the inclusion or exclusion of North 
Koreans in the South Korean governrnent's conception of Korean national identity, which 
in tum has an effect on the integration process of North Korean asylum seekers. This 
process consists of social, economic and psychological factors of integration. Our content 
analysis examines the period beginning from the 1990s to show whether this integration 
process is affected by the development of separate North and South Korean national 
identities. Parts of the se differences include the widening gap between both countries' 
social and economic structures. 
In addition to these more visible indicators, the psychological element is another 
determinant of the integration of North Korean asylum seekers in the South, as weil as the 
receptiveness of South Koreans to these newcomers. The assumption that adaptation 
would be easier in the ROK because of a shared Korean ethnicity, and thus a corn mon 
national identity, is often the reason why North Koreans have chosen to seek asylum in 
South Korea. However, the hypothesis to be tested here is that over the decades, Korea 
has remained divided not only politically but increasingly with regards to their national 
identity. As a result, the growing absence of a united Korean sentiment leads to 
difficulties for North Koreans in the integration to South Korean society. 
The significance of this thesis is twofold: it questions the homogeneity of Korean 
nationalism in South Korea, and it examines the Integration of North Korean asylum 
seekers. The section on Korean nationalism in South Korea analyses its "myth" after 
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over fi ft y years of separation and isolation. For South Korean policymakers, the issue of 
North Korean asylum seekers' adaptation to South Korean society is particularly 
important for the development of a unified Korean society. In anticipation of Korean 
reunification and under the assumption that North Koreans will be adapting to the South 
Korean way of life, understanding the problems of integration encountered by North 
Korean asylum seekers will provide strong indicators ofwhat to expect when the border 
between the North and South ceases to exist. The South Korean govermnent wishes to 
avoid a re-enactment of Germany's sudden unification, where a problem in integration of 
Germans from the East in the West is still present after almost two decades of unification. 
The integration process of North Koreans provides an index of the adjustments and 
resources needed for the South Korean government to ensure the success of future 
unification. In its assumed role as 'big brother' to the DPRK, the ROK government has 
developed policies specifie to North Korean refugees based on the principle of a single 
Korean nation, while providing services and incentives for the saelomin's3 successful 
integration. 
By demonstrating that a separate North and South Korean national identity exists, 
based on cultural, sociological, and political factors, a step is taken to challenge this 
"myth" that there has been no evolution in Korean culture on either side of the 38th 
parallel and that it has remained static for over half a century. This recognition of distinct 
national identities is important for the ROK government to consider when developing 
policies for North Korean integration, so that measures may be taken to accommodate the 
specifie needs of North Koreans to adjust to mainstream South Korean society. 
J Sae/omin is the most récent term created by the ROK government in referring to North Korean asylllm 
seekers. It is generally lIsed to refer to the more recent arrivais (i.e.: post-1990s). It literally means 'new 
arrivais' . 
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Definition of Terms 
National Identity and Korean Nationalism 
For the purpose ofthis study, the definition ofnationalism used is based on 
Benedict Anderson's definition of the nation that, "it is an imagined political community-
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign" (Anderson 1991,6). More 
specifically, the Korean nation is a historical construct that reflects the consciousness of 
the people and has been imagined on the basis of blood relationships, regional ties, 
common language and culture. 
Korean history has constructed its nationalist philosophy based on the importance 
of kinship and blood ties, which are reinforced by the strong presence of Confucian 
values both within the government and society as a whole. However, over the course of 
history where changes in society have occurred, so have the forms of nationalism used to 
best de scribe Korean identity. Although each phase may be supported by a different 
underlying approach of nationalism, Korean nationalism does not fail to emphasize the 
importance of a common historicallineage in support of its argument. 
Social Integration 
The concept of social integration in this thesis refers to the asylum seekers' ability 
to participate in the social, economic, educational and civil elements of the host society at 
a level that is comparable to the receiving country's general population (Brindelli 2003, 
710). Social integration is considered a process rather than the result of a final outcome 
and is mainly referred to as "the desirable way by which newcomers should become 
members of the receiving society" (Li 2003, 315). In the case of North Korean asylum 
seekers, the desirable outcome for South Korean policymakers is their eventual 
assimilation into main stream society and their peaccful co-existence with the general 
population, 
North Korean Asylum Seeker 
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Although North Koreans who have left their country of origin have often been 
referred to as defectors and refugees, the use of such concepts sha11 be avoided, ex ce pt 
when discussing them in a specifie context. The South Korean government has recently 
chosen to abandon the term talbulg'a, litera11y meaning 'a person who's tled the North' ta 
saetomin, having the literai translation of 'new arrivais', While today, the term talbukju is 
still used when referring to North Korean asylum seekers, it Îs gradually being replaced 
with the saetomin, It is a term conceived by the South Korean government as an act of 
good faith towards North Korean asylum seekers, sa as to help in their integration process 
by eliminating names such as talbukja, which North Koreans feel have negative 
connotations, In this thesis, the term saetomin Îs used to refer to the North Korean 
asylum seekers. 
Methodology 
The method used for this research is a content analysis. The proximity analysis 
approach to content analysis is used inChapter 3. In the section on South Korean 
textbooks and the South Korean press, a search was made for any references to North 
Koreans. The affect extraction of content analysis is used in Chapter 5, which considers 
the integration of North Korean asylum seekers residing in South Korea. The research 
relies on secondary sources and wherever possible, primary sources. Evidence 
demonstrating that separate North Korean and South Korean national identities is 
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examined. Although the presence oftwo Korean nations with opposing ideologies may 
be an obvious indication that two forms of Korean national identities do exist, the 
national sentiment studied here will be observed through an examination of the presence 
of such division using indicators of nationalism su ch as the media, education and national 
symbols. 
Other sources consist of interviews of North Korean asylum seekers already 
conducted by other researchers and NGOs. Although interview questions vary, analysis 
of the interview will be carried out according to elements of national identity. These 
interviews are examined to provide insight on the thoughts and sentiments of asylum 
seekers with regard to life in South Korea, and in particular, their experiences of 
integration to mainstream South Korean society. Due to limited time and lack of 
sufficient resources, it was not possible for the researcher to conduct her own interviews. 
Sorne other primary sources are included, such as proceedings of official meetings 
between North and South Korea, literary sources and works written by South Korean 
politicians themselves. These latter sources shall be used mainly in the comparative 
component ofthis research, to illustrate the changes in government policy in relation to 
the arrivaI of North Korean asylum seekers in South Korea and of the portrayal of the 
Korean nation. Secondary sources will consist of: commentaries, newspaper and journal 
articles, reports and monographs addressing the issue of Korean nationalism, as weil as 
discussing the challenges of integration of North Korean asylum seekers. 
Limitations of the Research 
Due to its sensitive nature, it is difficult to access complete and comprehensive 
documents on the issue of North Korean refugees in terms of exact numbers and their 
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situation. Most of the information comes from human rights and religious groups, as weil 
as other international organisations dealing with the issue. Much valued information 
comes from those who have experienced life in North Korea themselves and are 
courageous enough to tell their story. NGOs are reluctant to divulge too mu ch 
information for fear that this will compromise their mission and endanger the lives of 
those they seek to protect. 
Although research on North Korean asylum seekers has increased, many of the 
published works are in Korean, with some in English. Much of the information focuses on 
one area of interestL such as the integration process and the human rights issue. When 
reading the texts, more often than not, evidence of a cultural bias is eminent. In 
American texts, there is stm much of the anti- sentiment and texts supporting N0I1h 
Korea are more anti-imperialist in nature. The outlook in South Korean texts tends to 
vary. Particular attention is given here to the reasons for the biases that may exist. 
Thesis Organisation 
The thesis has two components: one exarnining the changing definition of Korean 
national identity as a process over time, between the Cold War and post-Cold War 
periods and the other considering the integration of North Korean asylum seekers during 
the same time frame. During the Cold War, the main reasons for North Koreans seeking 
refuge was politically motivated and their numbers were quite low, ranging from nine to 
fifty-two per year from 1991 to 1995 (Koh et al. 2004, 68). Following the death of Kim Il 
Sung, North Korea's leader and 'founder', in 1994, torrential floods resulted in food 
shortages and widespread famine. The motivation for leaving North Korea was no longer 
only political, but became socio-economical, and the result was an exponential increase ih 
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the number of North Korean asylum seekers. In 1994, it led to " ... food shortages, [which] 
drove most refugees to flee without premeditation to escape starvation" (Park 2003, 738). 
The second part of the thesis is a comparison ofthe integration process of North 
Koreans in South Korea for the two periods mentioned above. In South Korea, the 
government has had an influence in shaping its citizens' national identity. This is 
particularly true during the 1960s and 1970s when the country was under a dictatorial 
leadership. The government's goal to assert South Korean identity has often been 
through anti-North Korean doctrine, which was prevalent in the period from the end of 
the Korean War (1953) until 1993. In the latter period, the ROK government sent 
humanitarian aid to North Korea to relieve the effects of drought and famine in the 
country. There was also a shift in the South's policy towards North Korea from outright 
anti-communism and adversity to cooperation and negotiation. 
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, this thesis consists of four chapters 
to be divided as follows: 
The first chapter presents the theoretical framework of the thesis. Jt discusses the 
theories of nationalism used to support the arguments of this research. A social 
constructivist approach of cultural nationalism is used as the theoretical base throughout 
this thesis. Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities is the main reference used for 
supporting the idea that separate North and South Korean nationalisms have developed 
within South Korea. In addition to the theories of nationalism, theories of social 
integration are examined. As part of the research, the integration process of North 
Korean asylum seekers, a literature review of government refugee and immigration 
policies, (with particular focus on immigrant integration) is also included. 
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The second chapter provides the historicaJ background of Korean nationalism. lt 
is divided into three main periods. These divisions are made in order to demonstrate that 
throughout history the Korean nation and nationalism have undergone periods of 
significant change. The main references used for these periods of Korean nationalism are, 
among others, Sun Chui Yang's The North and South Korean Polilical Systems and 
Carter J. Eckert et al.'s Korea Old and New: A History. The period after the division of 
the Korean peninsula, with a focus on South Korean nationalism, is examined with 
reference to works by Gi-Wook Shin and James Palais, in addition to the above-
mentioned texts. These texts are used to illustrate that preconditions for a divergence in 
Korean national identity were present prior to the formaI political division of the Korean 
peninsula. 
Chapter three seeks to demonstrate the presence of distinct Korean nationalisms 
which extend beyond political division. This chapter illustrates that there are indicators 
other than that of political division which add to the emergence of a separate North and 
South Korean national identity. While politics will always be an integral factor in the 
division of Korean nations, cultural and social indicators are used to illustrate this fact, 
more specifically education, the media and national symbols are the indicators used for 
this purpose. 
Both the media and education have a large influence on citizens' opinions of 
particular matters. In South Korea, the media, such as newspapers and news broadcasts, 
has had an impact in forming Koreans' opinions about North Korea; often in accordance 
with the government' s desires. 
To demonstrate the influence of education on Korean citizens, an analysis of 
textbooks used during the Park Chung Hee era and 2005 are conducted to examine 
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whether or not the image of North Korea and its citizens has changed over the years. ln 
addition, references are made to the comparative sludies conducted by Dennis Hart and to 
, 
essays and analyses found on the Korean Ministry of Education's online source. In the 
case of media influence, secondary sources on the influence of Korean media are 
examined. Korean newspaper articles are also consulted. Publications of Korea Focus are 
examined from its first issue in 1993 to its latest one in 2006, focusing on articles about 
North Korean refugees and defectors. The image of North Korea that the South Korean 
govemment wishes to portray to its citizens is often reflected in the media. Textbooks 
chosen for this study are those used for Social Studies and those for Moral Education. 
Excerpts from each book, which specifically address North Korea, are analysed for their 
content and vocabulary. The content is studied for the type of information meant to be 
taught to the children. An analysis of the vocabulary used is important, since the Korean 
language has many adjectives, and the slightest nuances can produce a completely 
ditIerent image. This is divided into three main themes: how the texts present the Korean 
War, the views on unification and on the images uscd to describe North Korea and its 
people. The texts used are: Social Studies and Moral Education books published between 
1979 and 2004. Ali sources are from primary school textbooks used in South Korean 
schools. 
National symbols, such as flags and a country's anthem, are tangible elements of 
national identity. They are particularly present in the celebration of national holidays. 
The holidays which the government chooses to celebrate and the manner in which they do 
also has an influence on citizen identity. The trends in the celebration of Korean 
Liberation Day and the Korean War Memorial Day, which are the national holidays 
celebrated in South Korea, are also examined. In addition to the se national holidays, 
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Korean War Monuments ±Î'om each of the periods are also studied; one ofwhich is the 
Korean War Memorial Museum that opened in Scoul; Korea~ in 1994. Liberation Day is 
an important holiday for both North and South Korea, as it marks the end to their long 
struggle from Japanese colonisation. Particular focus is put on the joint North-South 
cel~brations ofthis holiday. Since it has been agreed by both parties to emphasize 
cultural and social exchange rather than political sentiment, by studying the celebrations, 
it is possible for one to depict differences between the North and South, as an indication 
that the Korean nation is not as homogenous as it is imagined to be. 
In chapter four, we investigate the reasons for the significant changes in North 
Korean migration trends. In this chapter, background information on North Korean 
asylum seekers is extracted from reports made by NOOs such as Refugees International 
and Human Rights Watch. The main source for the South Korean government's policies 
and programs for North Koreans are the White Paper on Unification, as weIl as other 
reports found on the Ministry of Unification online resource. In addition, references are 
made to Won Jae Chun's, A New Phase of North Korean Issues and Changdong Choi's 
The Legal Status ofNorth-Korean Refugees and Programfor Supporting Them. 
The final chapter examines the reasons why North Korean asylum seekers are 
having such difficulty in integrating into South Korean mainstream society. In this 
process, the psychological and socio-economic elements of migrant integration are used. 
References on the integration of North Korean asylum seekers consist of interviews 
conducted by other researchers, namely, Taek Jeon Woo and Jae Chun Won, in addition 
to relevant studies conducted by NOOs and other scholars on this issue. 
Chapter 1 - Theories of Nationalism, National Identity and Social Integration 
Theories ofNationalism and National Identity 
There is much debate with regards to the theories and concepts of nationalism, one 
of which is defining nations and nationalism. The definition of a nation may be 
categorized into two groups: objective and subjective. The most common definition of a 
nation with objective factors is that given by Joseph Stalin, who states, "a nation is a 
historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common 
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in common 
culture" (Smith 2001, Il). Definitions highlighting more 'subjective' factors, such as 
memory and attitude, are those of the constructivist thinkers of nationalism, such as 
Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. Gellner remarks that nationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness - it invents nations where they do not exist; 
while Benedict Anderson refers to nationalism as, "an imagined political community". 
The general concept shared by these scholars of nationalism suggests that the 
nation is a phenomenon created primarily as a result of social interaction. In this respect, 
Elie Kedourie characterises national self-determination to be based on an individual's will 
and autonomy (Kedourie 54 in Hutchison and Smith, 1994). The emphasis here is placed 
on the individual that plays a pivotaI role in deciding whether or not a nation shall exist. 
Importance is placed on history and traditions, which Kedourie sees as key elements for 
building a nation; in the sense that individuals sharing a common identity should come 
together and create a nation. This suggests that while nations are created by autonomous 
individuals, historical similarities determined by the examination of the past are essential 
in establishing favourable conditions for creating a separate nation. Kedourie states that 
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the nation is a social force that can be eroded. lt is eroded in the idea that foreign 
influence on the customary social practices ofa nation such as politics and religion, 
results in the breakdown of its traditional values which changes with each subsequent 
generation. Thus, the metamorphosis of a nation is implied by the idea that its changes are 
continuous and in a direction leading away from its original traditions and structure. 
The definitions of nations mentioned gives light to the second debate on 
nationalism which is based on the question of its origins. These may be divided into three 
main ideas; the first being that ofprimordalism, as is supported by Kedourie and fits in 
with the depiction of the South Korean state's definition ofa nation. South Koreans are 
taught at an early age that nations and blood ties are in direct correlation with one another. 
Textbooks used in South Korean middle and high schools emphasise the importance of 
culture and history in the nation. Since it is believed that nations and blood ties are 
directly related, one can assume that shared cultural traits are present only among those 
who are part of a common ancestry. 
The second approach is by perennialists, such as Anthony Smith, who seek to 
combine the concept ofpost-modernist and traditional values, while providing other 
explanations for the origin of nations. According to Smith, the preconditions for the 
creation of a nation are composed of several cultural markers such as language, religion 
and customs, as weIl as physical factors such as a fixed territory and a common history, 
whether it is "real" or constructed. For Smith, the formation of a nation occurs through 
the participation of not only the ruling class, but of the whole population, that not only 
acknowledges membership of a nation but also shares its ideology. The important element 
for Smith is not whether an individual has similar physical or cultural characteristics as 
other members, but that an emotional attachment is made with the nation. Although 
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Smith's view of a nation is based on the pre-existing cultural factors: kinship, religious 
and belief systems, the emphasis is placed on the sentimental connection with the nation. 
A third explanation for the nation is that ofthe constructivists, who perceive the 
nation as something that is modem and constructed. As previously mentioned, Gellner's 
idea of a nation is one that is invented. As explained by Hutchison and Smith, Gellner 
defines nationalism as " ... the consequence of a new form of social organisation, based on 
deeply internalized, education-dependent high cultures, each protected by its own state" 
(Hutchison and Smith 1994, 63). Gellner sees the construction of a nation as one that is 
derived out of necessity, rather than of sentiment. It is considered to be a conscious act 
made by its members. In order to make a nation that is strong and lasting, its members 
must be educated and have sorne level oftechnological knowledge. The norm of such 
education is universalliteracy, which is what Gellner believes is the binding force of the 
citizens. 
Benedict Anderson defines nations as an imagined community, due to the fact that 
although there are commonalities linking a group of people together, because oftheir 
large number, it is not possible to me et every one of its members. While it is possible for 
one to have an image of the similarities shared, the differences are not always so evident 
and are often forgotten. His definition differs from that of Gellner' s in the sense that 
Anderson sees the nation as something that is created rather than built, like a mechanical 
structure. This creation is one that is based on historical events which lead to the 
consciousness of nationalism. The spread of such imaginings was made possible by the 
emergence of print capitalism, which contributed to the awareness of such national 
consciousness. 
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With respect to the question relating to the nation, there is also the notion of 
ethnicity and ethnic groups. While often used interchangeably by theorists, there is a 
distinction between nations and the ethnic group. Ethnicity is derived from primordial 
traits, whereas nationality is something that is "created," as is defined by Anderson. 
Ethnicity and nation are a matter of perception based on how individuals view themselvcs 
and on how society categorizes them. Sometimes the categories made by the "Others" 
may shape the perception of the' Self . 
This study uses the constructivist approach in defining the ROK govemment's 
concept of the Korean nation. It is used to demonstrate that despite the South Korean 
govemment's declaration that ail ethnic Koreans living on the peninsula are members of 
the South Korean community, that reality states otherwise. Upon the examination of 
saetomin integration in the South, it is evident that the imagined Korean nation no longer 
exists. The image of the Korean nation has been divided into a South Korean and a NOlih 
Korean one. 
Social Integration 
The study of immigrants and their integration into the host society is a fairly 
recent one. In the United States, Park and Thomas, members of the Chicago School, 
began studying the integration of ethnic minorities in the 1920s; while in Europe, 
integration studies began mostly in the 1960s. However, it was only in the 1970s and 
1980s that scholars and policy makers began to seriously consider the study of immigrant 
integration into their host countries. In the United States, it was the period following a 
large number of immigrants from non-European countries, as a result of their more open 
immigration policy for high1y skilled people mainly from Asia. In Europe, it was a time 
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when policy-makers came to realise that the foreign migrant workers they hired were not 
returning to their home countries, but intended to permanently settle in the host country 
(Dewitte 1999, 6). In the past, more attention was given to the examination of migration 
patterns, with particular interest in the relationship between migration and economic 
matters. However, the increasing number of migrants permanently settling in ho st 
countries has sparked a recent concern in the integration process of these immigrants. 
One of the most common debates that arise when referring to immigrant 
integration is the terminology used. The term "integration" has most often, in the past, 
been synonymously linked with "assimilation" (Dewitte 1999, 7), one that is said to be 
most accurate wh en referring to the tradition theories ofintegration (such as the U.S. 
Chicago School). Rainer Baubock states that "integration is a concept that is ambiguous. 
It can come to mean the "acceptance" of new members, or to the "the forces of internaI 
cohesion within the wider social unit" (Cohen, lOin Dewitte 1999). Integration policies 
will not necessarily create unit y within a nation, but may just as weIl have the opposite 
effect by creating more awareness of the 'Other'. This image is best described by the 
following: "'integration' is a term used to indicate different levels of adaptation and 
participation in various aspects of the host society, in a continuous process ranging from 
assimilation to coexistence, and in sorne cases, to segregation of immigrants" (Bonifazi 
and Strozza 2003,691). It "is considered as a pathway involving the newcomers and the 
host society, which can either favour or inhibit the immigrant inclusion, and which 
requires different processes and levels of adaptation to new situations" (Bonifazi and 
Strozza 2003,692). One perspective that scholars agree upon is that problems in the 
socio-cultural integration of migrants into their host countries do exist. However, the 
manner in which they discern this process widely varies. Sorne of the ways in which 
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migrant integration may be considered are as: " ... the complete conformity to the national 
way of life of the immigration country; the complete self-identification and preservation 
of the immigrant group in the new society; cultural pluralism, i.e. acceptance of the 
fundamental values of the host-society and at the same time preservation of the immigrant 
culture, ... " (Baglioni 1964, 125). Rather than using these observations as definitions of 
migrant social integration, the y may be used as markers for measuring the degree to 
which migrants integrate into their host countries. 
The use of assimilation for understanding recent immigration was provided by 
members of the Chicago School, Robert E. Park and W.I. Thomas, in 1921."[T]he social 
science use of assimilation emerged at the highpoint of a previous era of immigration and 
by means of observations in a city where the first and second generation then constituted 
the great majority of residents" (Alba and Nee 1997, 828). Literature on immigrant 
adaptation found mainly in sociology described assimilation as the dominating factor in 
integration. Portes and Zhou explain that there are" ... assumptions that there is a natural 
process by which diverse etlmic groups come to share a common culture and to gain 
equal access to the opportunity structure of society;" (Zhou 1997, 976). This process 
generally entails abandoning old cultural behaviour and adopting new ones. 
Park and Burgess, c1assical assimilationists, provided an early definition of social 
assimilation as being "the name given to the process or processes by which peoples of 
diverse racial origins and different cultural heritages, occupying a common territory, 
achieve a cultural solidarity sufficient at least to sustain a national existence" (Alba and 
Nee 1997,828). They see assimilation as a process ofthree stages: the first one of 
competition, where the newly arrived immigrants go through a period of instability during 
their initial struggles of familiarising themselves with their new surroundings and of 
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trying to establish a mode of living equal to the nationals of their country of immigration. 
The second stage is accommodation; where the immigrants have a better understanding of 
their position in the host society and have sorne involvement in its institutions. The final 
stage is assimilation, a process deemed as "progressive and irreversible". This theory 
implies that assimilation is inevitable and that it is always the end goal for migrants, even 
in multicultural societies. 
Milton Gordon believes that integration begins with cultural assimilation (also 
referred to as acculturation), but does not automatically lead to other forms of 
assimilation such as structural assimilation, which consists of involvement in local 
institutions, intermarriage with the 'locals'. He found that most migrants would fall 
somewhere between acculturation and 'structural" assimilation, "the entry of members of 
an ethnie minority into primary-group relationships with the majority group" (Alba and 
Nee 1997,829). 
Gordon defines acculturation as "the minority group's adoption of "cultural 
patterns" of the host society, [which] typically cornes first and is inevitable" (Alba and 
Nee 1997, 829). He also notes that while extrinsic traits such as language acquisition, the 
way of dress, involvement in the ho st society's social and economic structure, are 
indicators that the migrants are more readily willing to assimilate by 'surrendering' those 
of their native culture; the intrinsic traits of migrants, which are the "vital ingredients of 
the group's cultural heritage" (Alba and Nee 1997, 829), are less evident in determining 
the degree to which they have been 'absorbed' by those of the host culture. 
Structural assimilation is viewed as the "entrance of the minority group into the 
social cliques, clubs and institutions of the core society at the primary group level" (Alba 
and Nee 1997, 830). Gordon believed that "once structural assimilation occurs ... aIl of 
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the other types of assimilation will naturally follow" (Alba and Nee 1997, 830) and that 
there will be a decline in prejudice and discrimination of the host country towards the 
migrants, resulting in the increase of intermarriages and a decrease in separate identities 
between the migrants and the locals. 
Gordon's classical the ory of assimilation has been seen as faulty for use in 
immigrant- based nations such as the United States and Canada, since there is an 
assumption that there are only two groups to con si der in the integration process - the 
dominant host country and the newly arrived immigrants. However, in multi -ethnic 
societies, one must consider not only the dynamic with the dominant culture, but the 
dynamic between the various sub-cultures and ethnic groups, as weIl. This model is seen 
as one that would be better suited for use in more homogeneous countries, where 
immigration has not been the basis for the nation's existence, such as Germany, France, 
South Korea, and Japan. 
Tomatsu Shibutani and Kian Kwan's ethnie stratification theory suggests that 
"how a person is treated in society depends 'not on what he is,' but on the 'manner in 
which he is defined'" (Alba and Nee 1997, 838). This implies that full assimilation is 
dependent upon the degree to which migrants are accepted by the dominant population 
and that it is dependent upon the reception and predisposition of natives towards 
immigrants. They believe that people are categorised in association with expected 
behaviour and treatment in accordance to their physical characteristics. ln this regard, 
those of ethnic origins differing from that of the host society are seen as more distinctive 
on the basis of their physical features and are, thus, more often expected to be less 
assimilated than those with similar ethnic backgrounds. 
A migrant's degrJe of interaction with the host society is also a determinant of 
assimilation. When there is a reduction of social distance between the host and the 
migrant, a form of structural assimilation occurs, where there is a sense of closeness 
between the groups and differences are less distinctive. Shibutani and K wan see social 
mobility and economic parity as an exception for individual minority groups and that in 
the ethnic stratification order, assimilation is the final step. In compliance with the, 
natural selection of competition where those who are more assimilated with the host 
society have a better chance of success, migrants will 'blend in' in order to exploit 
resources of the environment, so that social and economic success may be achieved. 
Host Society Reception 
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Much of the studies about immigrant integration have focussed on the immigrants 
themselves. However, an examination ofhost-societies is also important in 
understanding immigrant incorporation. Immigrant experiences vary according to 
destination countries - from traditional immigrant nations to newer immigrant nations, 
such as Europe and Asia. Jeffrey Reitz outlines four features ofhost societies as 
detenninants for successful immigrant incorporation. White each has its distinctive 
characteristics, they are aU interconnected. The first of Reitz' indicators for integration 
are the pre-existing ethnic or race relations within the host population. The reception of 
immigrants is affected by inter-group influence from the receiving country. The ethnic 
composition of the host society has an effect on how weIl immigrants are accepted. 
Preconceived attitudes towards ethnic groups and inter-group boundaries and hierarchies 
are the basis of social framework for integration. These attitudes may be shaped in the 
form of formaI and informai institutions" .. .including laws, organisational policies and 
practices, interest groups, and popular culture, aIl ofwhich may affect the opportunities 
available to newcomers and the constraints they fate" (Reitz 2002, 1006). 
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A second characteristic, one of the most traditional elements used in the study of 
immigrant integration, is related to the labour market in the host country, since in the past, 
people displaced mainly for labour purposes. The differences in labour markets and 
related institutions are, thus, a second feature of the ho st societies' influence on social 
integration. The studies conducted focussed on mainly immigrants in a particular labour 
market; the y showed that the number of immigrants increased in countries where there is 
a demand for workers that cannot be met by the local population. This shortage may 
influence changes in government immigration policies to become less restrictive, so that 
local labour markets can be filled. An example of such a case is the U.S. government's 
lift on restricting immigrants from non-European countries in 1965, so that labour 
demands in the health sector could be met. 
This leads to the third element of receiving nations, which is the impact of 
government policies and programs. The impact of government policies includes 
immigration policy, policies for immigrant integration, and policies for the regulation of 
social institutions. Immigration policies influence the selection process and the 
composition of immigrant populations in the government's attempt to have a desired 
outcome. However, this has proven to have very limited influence, resulting in the 
impotence of immigration policy. Sorne scholars believe that the nation-state has much 
control over the arrivaI of "undesired" immigrants and refugees, while others say that 
many of the labour-importing countries are failing to do so (Cornelius and Tsuda, 5 in 
Cornelius et al. 2004). The Gap Hypothesis is the term used to de scribe this phenomenon 
where a discrepancy lies between the intended outcome of government policy and the 
25 
actual result. It has been found that when industrialised countries sought to recruit highly 
skilled workers, attempts were unsuccessful, ~hereas when low-skilled labourers were 
recruited, they were "too sllccessful". Policy gaps are said to be of two kinds: "those 
caused by the unintended consequences of policy, and those caused by inadequate 
implementation or enforcement of policy" (Reitz 2002, ] 006). 
Immigrant reception is affected by other government po]icies, su ch as language 
training, programs for immigrant integration and settlement, training, counselling, 
employment, housing and 'multicultural' policit~s (Reitz 2002, ]013). A government's 
social policies do not always affect immigrant reception. It may seem like a particular 
immigrant group is targeted due to the effect that it has on a social group where there is a 
higher concentration of immigrants. 
Immigration and Refugee Policies 
As with social integration theories, refugee and immigration policies are often 
generalised into one category. One cannot talk about immigration policies without 
discussing integration policies. The increasing flow of migrants and refuge es are seen as 
having a toll on the welfare state, particularly when the receiving country experiences an 
economic recession. For govemments, the development of immigration policies calls for 
concem as to how immigrants will influence state identity, national security and political 
stability. These factors are taken into consideration when deciding what types of 
immigration control policies should be implemented, so as not to disrupt the peace and 
stability of the receiving country. The most common means of control of migrants are 
visa restrictions and mandatory permits in order to legally stay in a country. As 
citizenship is the most common approach used to examine the relationship between 
migrants and their host countries, it is also a good basis for examining a government's 
immigration policies. 
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Scholars in migration and ethnie relations, such as CastIes and Miller, define three 
types of citizenship. 'Ethnie' or 'exclusive', which exists in Germany, Austria, and 
Switzerland, makes it difficult for migrants and their descendants to attain citizenship by 
creating cultural and institutional barriers. 'Assimilationist' l'republican' is evident in 
France, where jus soli is a form of citizenship, but on the condition that migrants are 
highly assimilated and there is little or no recognition of cultural difference. 
'Multicultural' l'pluralist', present in the United States, Canada, and Britain, provides 
easier access and recognises ethnie minorities (Koopmans and Statham 2000, 19). 
These definitions coincide with the three 'traditional' typologies used to study 
European integration policies shared by both CastIes and Hollifield. The first of the se is 
the guest worker model, when temporary residents of another state go to a different 
country to meet the needs of a shortage in the labour market. These workers often do not 
have the same protection as the state's own citizens. Most often, these 'guests' continue 
to stay in the host country long after their work mandate has expired. This differs from 
the permanent immigration model where immigration is a part of government policy and 
is 'welcomed'. However, a gap has been observed in this policy. More often th an not, 
labour migration becomes permanent. 
The assimilation model, which is practiced in France, consists of a government 
policy that welcomes permanent immigration. Immigrants are given legal status in the 
country upon condition that the y are willing to assimilate into the dominant culture; that 
is, to adopt its language, ideologies and way oflife. Minority groups are generally not 
recognised in these states. In nations where assimilation policies are adopted, the jus soli 
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system applies, where citizenship is given to those who are born in the nation's territory. 
The jus sanguinis system is one where citizenship is awarded based on blood ties and is 
acquired by birth. As a result, a form ofhierarchy in citizenship prevails, and not aIl 
residents are treated equally. This system is most often found in countries, such as 
Germany and South Korea, where national and ethnie pride results in the government' s 
reluctance to give residential status or citizenship to 'foreigners' and preference is ghen 
to those of the same ethnie origin. 
The third model, the ethnie minorities' model, used in the United Kingdom, 
recognises the immigrants' ethnie origins. Unlike in France, minority groups are 
recognised and are encouraged to maintain their cultural heritage as long as they are 
willing to adapt to the host country's main ideologies and social structure, so as not to 
disrupt its equilibrium. Immigrants are permanent and defined in terms oftheir ethnie 
origin, and communities are formed either by ethnie origin or religion. In this model, 
regardless of the fact that one was born in the country, complete assimilation into 
mainstream society is not expected. 
Refugee Policies 
The assumption that countries are organized as nation-states is said to be the basis 
for understanding refugee policies and the global norm for political organizations. Nation-
states have the right to self-determination, "the right to demand the means to preserve, 
protect, and foster their peoplehood, their culture, their way of life, and their home land" 
(Keely1996, 1046). States may produce refugees due to the presence of more than one 
nation, the population may disagree with the economic structure of the nation, or there 
may be an implosion of the state due to a lack of resources (Keely 1996, 1046). In 
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addition, people forced to leave their own country due to racial, ethnie, religious, or 
political reasons may be under the protection of iilternational treaties. 
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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) produced the 
United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) and extended 
Protocol (1967), to which many nations are signatory. It defines refugees as "individuals 
who~ owing to 'weil founded fear of persecution' for reasons ofpolitical opinion, race, 
religion nationality or membership in a particular social group are outside their country of 
nationality and are unable to return to it" (Gibney 2004, 60). This generally results in 
broken trust iilld failed protection between an individual and the government to which 
citizenship he or she possesses. Asylum seekers are refugees who are already in the 
country where they seek claim. 
Asylum provides protection to those who are escaping desperate economic or life-
threatening situations in their own country: "[a]1l Western states have implemented over 
the last three decades a remarkable array of restrictive measures" (Gibney 2004, 2). Since 
industrialised Western nations have already spent mu ch money and resources for asylum 
seekers, the desired outcome is to limit the arrivai of refugees into their country and more 
particularly, to discourage pennanent settlement. The UNHCR recommends that in order 
to maintain a certain international equilibrium, the preferred solution is to repatriate 
refuge es whenever possible. However, in most cases, this is not reality, and international 
refugees tend to resettle permanently in the countries where the y seek asylum. 
Although in principle, asylum is supported, in reality, states prefer not to have 
refugees. A large influx of refugees may be a cause for concern for a nation' s national 
security and affect the social dynamics in the country, and even possibly cali into 
question its national identity. Re-examination of immigration and other social policies 
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would be required in order to accommodate or dekr refugees, in addition to allocating 
resources. Nations are limited in their willingness to accommodate 'non-citizens', as most 
nations work towards the protection of the nation and their own citizens. 
South Korean Immigration and Refugee Policy 
As a country that has traditionally sent migrant workers to other nations, South 
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Korea's immigration policies are still in the early stages of development. The country's 
economic success and change in status from a developing to an industrial nation has 
created a demand for migrant workers to fill the shortage of labourers in the low-Ievel 
jobs in the South. As a result, the ROK has experienced the arrivaI of a large number of 
immigrants in the last few decades. In order to understand the country's immigration 
policies better, one must also take a look at its emigration policies and, particularly, the 
evolution of the South Korean governrnent' s policies towards the overseas Koreans, since 
all are connected to its emigration policy. Thus, Korean migration issues may be divided 
into "overseas Korean issues" (emigration) and foreign immigration to Korea. 
Korean Overseas 1<isues 
South Korea has had a policy of sending its citizens abroad as migrant workers 
that dates as far back as 150 years. From the beginning of the 20lh C, Koreans were sent 
to work as labourers on plantations in the US, Mexico and Cuba. ln the mid-20lh C, South 
Koreans were sent abroad through overseas adoptions to Europe and the US. More 
recently, affluent South Koreans sent their children to English-speaking countries for 
advanced education and to improve their language skills. There is an estimate of over 6 
million overseas South Koreans (Lee 2005, 1). About 2.1 million reside in the United 
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States, the second largest Korean population after China, which has about 2.5 million 
overseas Koreans. The Korean population in China is not the result of Korea's 
emigration policy, but ofa 'natural' form of migration; in the late 18th Century, large 
numbers settled in Manchuria, the north-eastern part of China, bordering the nOl1hern part 
of the Korean peninsula. This migrant population sought to escape Korean political 
instability of the Joseon Dynasty and later to escape Japanese occupation. The region was 
eventually the base for national independence movements against Japan (Lee 2003, 3). 
The majority of Koreans can be found in the Korean Autonomous Prefecture of Yanbian, 
in the Chinese province of Jilin, which borders North Korea and Russia. 
From the establishment of the ROK in 1945, to the mid-1990s, immigration policy 
has been put on the back bumer in Korea. This was mainly because the govemment had 
more 'pressing' matters to tend to, such as nation-building. Between 1945 and 1960, 
there was a preoccupation to rebuild a nation, which had been divided and destroyed by 
war. Social, economic and po1itical stability were the govemment's main concem, as well 
as national security matters, which concemed threats from North Korea; resources were 
limited, and social stability was of primary concern. 
As part of a globalisation policy to recognise the contributions of overseas 
Koreans to the country, the South Korean government passed the "Overseas Korean 
Foundation Bill" in Mach 1997 (Lee 2005, 9). The definition of an overseas Korean in 
this bill changed from "a person that is of ethnic Korean origin, regardless of his or her 
nationality, who is currently living in a foreign country" (Lee 2005, 12), to "a person of 
ethnic Korean origin who has obtained the citizenship of a country other than South 
Korean" (Lee 2005, Il). However, the final definition was later modified to exclude 
sorne ethnic Korean groups, such as the descendants of migrants to the USSR, China and 
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Japan who had left over 50 years ago and who make up Il % of the population (Lee 2005, 
12). Presently, the Ministry of Justice defines overseas Koreans as, "a person who either 
had Korean citizenship in the past or who was the direct relative of a foreign national that 
had been designated by the president" (including adopted Koreans) (Lee 2005, 12). Other 
policies adopted to protect the interests of Koreans abroad have been criticised for 
excluding the 2nd and 3rd generation Koreans ofwhom many have assimilated into their 
local environment, which are used for the purpose of promoting assimilation into Korean 
culture rather than the acculturation of overseas Koreans. 
Foreign Migration in South Korea 
As a newly receiving country, South Korea's immigration policies are still in the 
early developmental stages, which are under the authority of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Department of Justice (Seol and Skrentny 2004, 494 in Cornelius et al.). 
International exposure as a result of a number of international events held in South Korea, 
such as the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul and the World Cup Soccer Games in 2002, 
as well as its reputation as one of the four rising economic dragons, has made the country 
an attractive destination for migrant workers. ln 2004, there was an estimated 751 000 
foreigners in South Korea, among whom 210 000 were illegal (Lee 2003,10). Foreigners 
in South Korea may be categorised as migrant workers, refugees and asylum seekers, and 
tourists and other foreigners. 
Migrant Workers 
In the early 1990s, foreign workers entered South Korea to meet labour demands 
in the manufacturing, textiles, and agriculture sectdrs. These workers arrived under the 
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auspices of the industrial training program established by the South Korean government 
in 1993, allowing for the entrance ofup to 20 000 foreign unskilled labourers into the 
country to partake in the trainee program. This pro gram provides one year of training and 
a 2-year work permit (Lee 2003,6). Conditions to partake in this program require that one 
must be 18-35, have no criminal record and come from one of the 14 countries with 
which the government has an agreement. The majority of migrant workers are nationals 
from China, lndonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal and Pakistan. Although the y arrive in South Korea as "trainees", these migrants 
are not given any particular training. In reality, the y are used to fill the labour demands in 
the dull, dangerous and dirty jobs that the skilled South Korean nationals refuse to do. 
Similar to Germany's guest worker laws, the South Korean government does not provide 
any long-term permits. This is based on the principle that the purpose of migrant workers 
is to complement the economy and not to settle in the country. 
Foreign workers in South Korea have a history of having been stigmati sed by 
discrimination and social prejudices. They are found to work much longer hours than the 
average South Korean citizens in poor working conditions (Lee 2005, 19). Many 
labourers choose to become illegal workers to double the earnings they would receive 
under the trainee program. However, illegal workers' conditions are subject to violations 
of human rights and labour laws. Due to their illegal status, workers are not entitled to 
health benefits, nor are the y likely to receive much government protection. Many 
employees do not honour the 1994 bill initiated by the Citizens' Coalition for Economic 
Justice, which requires employers to provide financial compensation to illegal workers for 
on- the- job injuries (Lee 2005, 20). 
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In 2003, the South Korean government passed a work permit law allowing for 
227 000 illegal workers to receive legal status. H;owever, in order to be eligible for such 
'luxury', one must have lived in South Korea for no more than four years as of March 
2003 and be currently working in one of the six areas of manufacturing: construction, 
service, agriculture, livestock, farming and fishery (Lee 2003,4). This law was passed in 
response to protests from migrant workers in Seoul and as a means to rectify the number 
of illegal workers in South Korea which has risenIrom 68 000 in 1992 to over 300000 in 
2003 (Lee 2005,21). 
Refugees and Asylum Seekers 
South Korea has been a signatory of the United Nations Convention relating to the 
status of refugees and its proto col since December 1992 UNHCR 2006), but has no 
internaI or national refugee law, and little public awareness or support is given to refugees 
and is restrictive towards 'foreign' asylum seekers (those who are not from North Korea l ). 
Asylum seekers without proper papers are not recognised by the government and are sent 
to the UNHCR office for temporary papers. Requests for asylum are subsequently 
considered on a case by case basis, which is processed through the Ministry of Justice and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The UNHCR declared that South Korea ranks among the 
lowest in the world in admitting asylum seekers (Lee 2003, 23). 
In 1994, the ROK amended its laws, allowing individuals to file for asylum for 
reasons of political or religious grounds once they have arrived in South Korea. Among 
the 50 requests received between 1994 and1999, ail were rejected (Lee 2003, 23). In 
February 2002, in accordance to the UNHCR, the South Korean government granted 
1 Since the South Korean constitution recognises North Koreans as its own citizens, they are not considered 
as asylum seekers, according to the South Korean government. 
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status to its first refugee - an Eritrean man. The South Korean govemment argues that 
one of the problems in granting asylum is that during the interview process, many have 
expressed the intention to settle in another country ônce they have been accepted. One 
reason for refugee settlement in a third country is due to the lack of programs that 
accommodate refugees. The Eritrean man later settJed in Italy because he could not obtain 
health insurance coverage for his pregnant wife in South Korea (Lee 2005, 8). Since then, 
of the 181 requests made in 2003, 14 were granted refugee status (Lee 2003, 24). 
However, even if the laws permit refugees to enter, they do not necessarily offer 
additional assistance with settling into their new environment. 
Because the South Korean Constitution underlines the fact that North Koreans are 
citizens of the Republic of Korea, North Korean asylum seekers are not required to go 
through the formaI application procedures that refugees of other ethnie origins must 
follow. They are, in principle, entitled to the same legal protection as South Koreans 
(Son 1999, 8). Once the North Korean asylum seekers arrive in South Korea, the y are 
"interviewed" by the South Korean govemment to determine wh ether they are indeed 
North Koreans2 and are genuine refugees, as opposed to North Korean government spies. 
Then, the y are escorted to Hanawon, the isolated govemment education facility where 
the y are required to stay for three months for "social and cultural adjustment" (MOU 
2005a, 5). During their stay, North Koreans are given lessons on food, culture, and the 
South Korean dialect, and must stay for the duration of their "training". Once the y 
"graduate" from the program, the North Koreans are "released" into mainstream South 
2 There have been reporteâ "~ases whère Chinese-Koreans pose as North Korean asylum seekers~ so that 
they can live in South Korea (in addition to benefitting fTom government subsidies which are given to North 
Koreans). This occurrence has developed mainly because Chinese-Koreans are considered 'foreigners' and 
are ineligible for applying for work and student visas the South Korean government offers to 'Overseas' 
Koreans, which gives them access to much of the same benefits as Korean citizens living in the ROK. 
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Korean society. These programs are designed for the purpose of facilitating the 
integration process of North Korean asylum seek~rs; however, many asylum seekers have 
said that because "[t]he programs in Hanawon focus more on South Korean culture and 
capitalist systems rather than teaching practical skills such as how to make a living in 
South Korea" (Na 2004), they experience much hardship in integrating into South Korean 
society. These policies are examined in more detail in chapter 5. 
Tourists and Other Foreigners 
Many of the illegal workers found in Korea have arrived with tourist visas or 
visiting permits and have stayed beyond the expiration oftheir visa. A number ofthem 
eventually marry local South Koreans and try to settle in the country. Past laws have 
granted residency and citizenship only to foreign women who married South Korean men. 
Foreign men who married South Korean women were granted a two-year permit to stay in 
South Korea, after which they could apply for citizenship (Lee 2003, 20). Often the 
children of these unions were considered foreigners, as their father was not South Korean. 
This policy stems from South Korea's patriarchal society structure, which believes that a 
woman marries into her husband's family. 
South Korea's underdeveloped immigration and refugee policies have been based 
on its government's primordial beliefthat the Korean nation has been created by a 
homogeneous ethnie community of Koreans from either side of the DMZ and supported 
by a shared history and culture. This importance is further highlighted in its programs and 
policies developed specifically for saetomin integration, who are often referred to as 
'long-Iost siblings' and have privileges which are not offered to any other immigrant or 
36 
refugee in South Korea. WhiIe these programs for integration are based on the idea that 
the saetomin are no different from regular South Koreans, as mentioned by Bonifazi and 
Strozzi, it may also create more awareness of the 'Other', thus establishing an invisible 
barrier between the saetomin and its host society. The pre-existing ethnic ties are 
insufficient in meriting successful integration. 
With reference to Anderson's concept of the nation, one may apply it to the 
continued belief oftraditional South Korean nationalists. They maintain strong 
convictions that there exists only one Korean nation on the peninsula, regardless of 
political division. Korean nationalists pushing for unification who believe that there is 
only one Korean nation that embraces both North and South Korea, are holding onto, 
upon escape from the North, the "imagined" Korean nation. As the years go by and as it 
becomes more evident that the differences of Korean culture are widening, one must 
examine the indicators for such faction. Evidence of this is demonstrated through the 
various accounts of North Korean asylum seekers who have sought refuge in South Korea. 
Chapter 11- History, Division, Identity - Korean Nationalism 
In order to obtain a clear idea of Korean nationalism, it is essential to understand 
the origins and conditions under which it developed. The purpose of this chapter is to 
provide a background on the formation of Korean nationalism. It also proposes to show 
that despite being a continuously changing process, the fundamental belief of Korean 
ethnic homogeneity has remained even after the division of the Korean peninsula and is a 
conviction shared by both North and South Korea. Although the main focus ofthis thesis 
is to examine the changing views of the Korean nation within South Korea, it would not 
be complete without examining the myth of Dangun; both Korean governments often 
refer to this when they speak about the Korean nation, and it is the symbol on which 
unification is based. This chapter introduces the emergence ofthe South Korean 'Self in 
terms of the North Korean 'Other' and considers how the former has adopted the role of 
the older sibling who takes care of the younger, weaker one. Historically, Korean national 
identity has been used as a [orm of self-preservation and a means of protection from 
external threats of colonisation and Western imperialism. 
The origins of the imagined Korean 1 nation is said to date back to the year of 
Dangun's birth in 2333 BC, the mythical figure who is often referred to as the founder of 
the Korean nation2• Throughout history, Korea's national consciousness has been defined 
based on the belief of its foundations of a "pure Korean race", a unified state and a unique 
indigenous culture that sets it apart from those of Japan and China (Pai 2000, 2). Korean 
history has directed its nationalist philosophy with great importance placed on kinship 
1 Until specified otherwise, the term "Korea" and "Korean" shall refer to the Korean peninsula as a who le, 
since references are made to a period prior to the creation of a North and South Korea and the general 
history of the Korean nation is accepted by both Koreas. 
2 The myth of Dangun, the progenitor of the Korean people, is an important one for Koreans, as it has often 
been used by both the North and South Korean govemments in supporting their arguments for reunification. 
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and blood ties, which have been reinforced with the strong presence of Confucian values 
both within the Korean government and society as a whole. However, over the course of 
history, when changes in Korean society have emerged, so have the forms ofnationalism 
used to best describe Korean identity. 
Scholars of Korean Studies have varying views on the origins of Korean 
nationalism. Sorne believe that it began in the latter part of the 19th C, while others mark 
the time from J apan' s annexation of Korea in 1910 as the moment of modem Korean 
nationalism. Despite these differences in analyses, there are however, sorne general 
observations of Korean nationalism upon which scholars agree: the Korean resistance 
against foreign invasion gave rise to modem nationalism, leading it to become a Hermit 
Kingdom and to adopt a policy against aIl things foreign; its realization of the need for 
rapid modernization and a national consciousness and identity, as weil as Japanese 
annexation was the catalyst for a fuIl-fledged Korean nationalist movement (Yang 1999, 
131). 
The Jate Joseon Dynasty (1392-1910) 
The late Joseon Dynasty was the last Korean kingdom before it was annexed by 
the Japanese. ln the latter years of the period, one can see the emergence of modem 
Korean nationalism. It is described as a period consisting of a high level of negativism: 
one that is anti-foreign, anti-Western, anti-Japanese, anti-Christian, and anti-colonial 
(Yang 1987,465), ofwhich its goal was to maintain Korean traditional order and to expel 
foreigners from Korean soil. The development of a Korean national consciousness was 
hindered by the strong influence of the Chinese Sung dynasty's neo-Confucian teachings 
on the Korean ruling elite. These teachings includcd the study of Confucian classics, 
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Chine se poetry and writing, literature, philosophy, politics and social thought. It also 
required maintaining a strict hierarchy within societ.y and in aIl other aspects of the 
peoples' daily lives, such as family, government and, in general, social interaction. Ethnic 
solidarity was the only real connection that the eliie had with the masses during this 
period, characterized by a strict hierarchical structure and difference in lifestyle created 
an artificial barrier between the peoples. 
A division among the elites was present in the interpretation of Korean 
nationalism. They were separated between those who wished to preserve Korean 
traditions and those who wished to encompass liberal ideas of the West. This division was 
more evident between the elite and the masses rather than between the elites themselves, 
where it was the elite class with desires to adopt more foreign ideas and the masses who 
wished to maintain tradition. The masses continued to wear traditional Korean clothes, 
used Hangeul rather than other foreign languages, such as Chine se, observed Shaman 
practices with Buddhist, Confucian, Christian ceremonies and enjoyed Korean sports, 
plays and music. It is said that "[t]he [Joseon] Dynasty's ruling elites and literati often 
despised, ridiculed and even suppressed the "ignorant" masses for such preferences and 
practices. In the end, however, the masses' unflinching nativistic resilience preserved the 
Korean national and ethnic identity" (Yang 1999,94). One of the reasons for this is thal 
the elite may have felt threatened by an increasingly educated and assertive population, 
thus reducing their control and power over the people. 
Japanese Annexation (1910-1945) 
The faIl of the Joseon Dynasty and Japanese colonization were the two factors 
that led to an active Korean independence movement and nationalist consciousness. 
The absence of a Korean autonomous state and the threat to their identity and 
culture led to the collaboration of Koreans " ... regardless of their social 
backgrounds ... The forcible loss of the Korean statehood reawakened a new sense 
of identity and solidarity among the people about the notion of nationhood and 
nationality" (Yang 1987,466). 
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There was a division between radical and moderate nationalists, who debated how 
Korean identity should be defined and how independence should be achieved. Moderate 
nationalists were known as the cultural movement, who believed in the graduaI process of 
independence through education and economic development (Robinson 1988, 
6). The "radicals" were intrigued by socialist revolutionary thought, followed the works 
of Marxist-Leninist ideology and applied it to Korea. 
According to Robinson, intellectuals are said to assume the responsibility of 
defining the nation and attaching symbolic value to it. They are at the heart of spreading 
national consciousness through education and literacy movements. They define the 
political agenda and create programs for achieving their goals (Robinson 1988, 10). 
Korean intellectuals wished to revive Korean traditions and historic symbols to validate 
their national identity and believed that Koreans \vould be ready for independence, once 
the masses had acquired a modem identity and values. This was based on the notion of a 
full understanding ofhistory and culture and on the idea that changing values could adjust 
behaviour. Despite these divisions, Koreans put aside their ideological differences to 
unite in their goal of developing a collective sentiment for independence. 
Japan's annexation of Korea ended on August 15,1945, as a consequence ofits 
defeat in the Second World War. Although nationalist movements did bring together 
Koreans in a form of solidarity, the cause was not strong enough to create a unified 
' . 
. ~" ' 
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Korean identity. While the concept of nation and liational identity are most commonly 
found in post-colonial countries, where social groups seeking power use their mission to 
"preserve" traditional national identity, "[t]he end of colonial mIe did not lessen but 
rather intensified contention over nation and national identity, this time between North 
and the South, both ofwhich c1aimed to be the legitimate Korean nation" (Shin 1999, 
149). 
Nationalism after Division 
On August 15, 1945, the day that Korea was liberated from Japanese mIe, 
Koreans believed that they had regained control over their own destiny. However, 
Koreans had politically and ideologically contrasting visions about the development of 
the nation, as during the years of colonialism. This faction among the Korean people was 
further deepened by the presence of American and Soviet armed forces on the peninsula, 
each respectively supporting Democratisation and Communism. 
The United States felt it necessary to fight Communism on the Korean peninsula, 
while the Soviet Union sought Korea for strategic interest. However, the latter's role was 
more as a guide for the northern Koreans in land distribution, labour reform and social 
equality. In the South, the United States distmstfuJ of the Korean People's Republic, an 
administration that the Koreans had organised themselves, helped form the Korean 
Democratic Party, on September 16, 1945. This group consisted of a group of wealthy 
landlords and businessmen (Eckert et al. 1990,338). In 1948, at the request of the 
American governrnent, the United Nations granted permission for supervised general 
elections in the southern part of Korea. Regardless of protests by the Korean people, the 
elections proceeded as scheduled. On August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea was 
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established, with Rhee Sygnman, an American-educated conservative with full support of 
the U.S. government, as its first president. In response to the events in the South, the 
North held elections 10 days later, electing Kim Il Sung as premier and establishing the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, declaring itself as the only legitimate 
governrnent on the peninsula. Under the auspices uf foreign powers, Korea established 
two separate interim govemments which were to be a temporary presence until a more 
pennanent solution could be agreed upon. 
On June 25, 1950, in an attempt to resolve the 'Korean problem,' the North 
invaded the South, offsetting a three-year civil war. Events in the ROK had set favourable 
conditions for war. In June 1950, southern leftist guerrillas on Jeju Island and in the 
South Jeolla province (Eckert et al. 1990, 344) led protests, which resuIted in bloodshed. 
In addition, Rhee expressed his desire for reunification by force. The Korean War 
resulted in an estimated total of $2 billion in property loss, 5 million refugees and 3 
million people dead or missing (Oberdorfer 1997, ] 0). The War ended with an Armistice 
Agreement in 1953. It left a legacy of fear and insecurity (Eckert et al. 1990, 346) and 
hardened antipathy for one another, shattering a 1300 year-old history ofunity. 
North Korean Nationalism 
North Korea's national identity is based on the Juche ideology, which translates 
into "self-reliance" or "self-sufficiency", and constitutes a Korean adaptation of Marxist-
Leninism. As with aIl forms of national identity, it is flexible and changes in accordance 
with historical events. The tenn Juche was first used in the] 920s to express anti-Japanese 
sentiment and prote st against Korean politicians who failed to maintain Korean 
sovereignty. It is based on the principle of rejectiIig foreign dependence and of supporting 
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the creation of a truly independent Korean nation. Kilh 11 Sung, the founder of Juche 
ideology and North Korea's leader, believed that the weakness of Korean nationalism was 
caused by Confucianism. Consequently, he eliminated the use of aIl Chinese characters 
and foreign words from the Korean language. He also rewrote history to glorify the 
nationalistic endeavours of the Korean forefathers. His goal was to create a "pure" 
Korean culture based on strong anti-foreign sentiment. "Juche helped the regime gain 
emotional support from the masses, since the doctrine not only rejected foreign 
domination but upheld whatever was considered to be 'Korean" (Eckert et al. 1990, 506-
507). Kim' s definition of a nation is a derivative of one given by Stalin: "a nation is a 
stable human group historically constituted on the basis of community of blood-lineage, 
language, territory, culture, ... Our nation is a unitary nation [which has] so long a history 
of five thousand years" (Eckert et al. 1990, 517). ln North Korea, in an attempt to 
preserve the purity ofhis idea of Korean national identity, Kim Il Sung recreated the 
"Hermit Kingdom" of the late Joseon period - the era prior to Korean annexation. South 
Korea' s economic growth in the 1970s was criticized for its collaboration with American 
imperialists, whom he declared " ... saturated the people with decadence and stripped off 
the soul and national character from the southern half of the fatherland" (Eckert et al. 
1990,557). 
In the 1960s, Juche was used as a geo-political strategy. By limiting its 
dependence on China and the Soviet Union for economic assistance, North Korea avoided 
involvement in the Sino-Soviet conflict, maintaining peaceful relations with its 
neighbours. It was in the 1960s and 1970s that Juche officially became a source of North 
Korean nationalism. At this point, it had achieved a certain amount of stability, and Kim 
Il Sung's charismatic leadership was steadily rising. Juche was used as a tool to show that 
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the North was ideologically superior to the South. Dy convincing North Koreans of their 
superiority over the South, Kim Il Sung was also able to legitimize his power. Juche 
began as a support for anti-foreignism. It later developed its national objectives into three 
main elements: political sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, and military defence 
(Park 1998,36). Anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism was the key for support of Juche 
by the guerrillas in Manchuria, who belonged to the North Korean elite. Its ultimate goal 
is freedom from outside pressure achieved through unconditional state loyalty by the 
people. 
South Korean Nationalism 
Rhee Syngman (1948-1960) 
Rhee was a big contributor to the Korean independence movement during the 
Japanese occupation. His book, The Spirit of lndependence, written while imprisoned, has 
been referred to as the "political Bible of the Korean people" (Rhee 2001,13). It was 
intended to encourage the people to work to preserve the nation and its independence. 
However, since it was published in the U.S., it did not reach the Korean masses. Instead, 
the overseas Koreans followed his call for a Korean independence movement. Rhee 
believed in peaceful means of nation-building. Unfortunately, he did not follow his own 
doctrine while in office. As a president, he is known for his autocratic and anti-
Communist administration which, under his orders, included many deaths and acts of 
violence. 
In 1948, under supervised elections by the United Nations forces, Rhee Sygnman 
was elected as the first president of the ROK. Rhee's leadership is comparable to the late 
Joseon monarch (Eckert et al. 1990, 348) and "seems to have shared with ail Korean 
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kings a conception of sovereignty as something m()re properly invested in a head of state 
than in a popular electorate or its representative" (Eckert et al. 1990, 348). 
The National Security Law (NSL), otherwise known as the "anti-Communist 
law," was passed by the National Assembly in 1948 as a measure to suppress opposition. 
It is vague, yet powerful. It can be used at one's own discretion for the prohibition of any 
restriction of freedom of speech, press, assembly, association "except as specified by 
law" (Eckert et al. 1990, 349). This set of laws, which allows the South Korean 
govemment to arrest anyone believed to be a part of Communist activity or to be a North 
Korean sympathizer, is in efIect to this day. 
Countless arrests and abuse of the NSL were made in order to pass the amendment 
to allow Rhee a third term. It was during his third term in office and following the April 
Revolution in 1960, that Syngman Rhee resigned as president to live in exile in Hawaii. 
His resignation was offset by the April Revolution, when on April 19, 1960, 30 000 
university and high school students protested at the presidential palace during Rhee's 
leadership (Eckert et al. 1990, 355). The country was under martiallaw, and there were 
arrests and shootings of peacefuI protesters. On April 25, there was support from the 
urban elite of 300 university professors. In addition, the U.S. calI for democratization and 
condemnation of repression, and General Song Y o-ch' an' s refusaI to shoot demonstrators 
by decree of martiallaw (Eckert et al. 1990, 355), a11 contributed to Rhee's resignation. 
Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) 
Regardless oftheir differences in ideology, North Korea's Kim Il Sung and 
46 
South Korea's Park Chung Hee possess similar views about Korean nationalism. ln 
recognition oftheir shared history and ethnicity divided by ideology, North and South 
Korea have become each other's antithesis oftheirdesires for a unified Korean peninsula. 
As Kim had denounced South Korea in detiance of the true Korean identity, Park 
reciprocated. However, Park underlined the differences in political ideology to 
emphasize his point. He stated that as a political community, North Koreans were not 
part of the same nation: "the legitimate national identity belongs to us in the Republic of 
Korea ... " we have a historic mission of preserving and enhancing this legitimate national 
identity" (Shin 1999, 152). Park continued, in his dec1aration, that the North were 
"subjected to a fanatic personality cult" and "forced to calI their own fathers 'comrades', 
which went against Korean tradition of filial piety" (Shin 1999, 152) Park Chung Hee, 
South Korea' s leader from 1961 until his assassination in 1979, justified his illegally 
prolonged authority as South Korea's president in the name of "national renaissance" and 
for the "modernization of the fatherland" (Shin 1999, 152). Emphasis was put on national 
consciousness based on Park's yusin reform, which emphasized anti-Communism. 
Contemporary Korean nationalism - 'Sunshine Policy', globalisation and anti-
Americanism 
Following Park Chung Hee's regime, his successors continued to govern the 
country following his anti-Communist Cold War policies towards North Korea, until 
1993, when changes towards democratization began in South Korea. That year, President 
Kim Young Sam, the first civilian president elected after 30 years of military rule, was 
determined to have a more 'liberal' policy towards North Korea. lt was one of 
, .. 
cooperation and reconciliation. His successor, Kim Dae Jung followed with the 
implementation ofhis Sunshine Policy. 
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After his inauguration as president in 1998, Kim Dae Jung expressed his 
intentions to "actively pursue reconciliation and cooperation" (Cumings 2005, 510), and 
rejected the notion of "unification by absorption". He increased food aid to North Korea, 
reduced restrictions ofROK investments in the North and called for the US to lift its 
economic embargo on the DPRK. This was a new approach to ROK policy with regards 
to the North. Instead of the call for reunification, priority was put on the peaceful 
coexistence of the two Koreas, in preparation for eventual reunification through 
democratic means. He saw the importance ofrecognizing North Korea's unique form of 
regionalism. The second phase of reunification would involve the creation of a Korean 
federal govemment with two autonomous regional governments, followed by 
centralization. 
There are three main principles to be followed under the Sunshine Policy: no 
tolerance of armed provocations by the North, South Korea should not try to absorb the 
North and the ROK should actively seek for cooperation and reconciliation with the 
DPRK. The activities planned for inter-Korean cooperation are: economic expansion 
between the North and South, by allowing for more investments, tourism, and 
humanitarian ex change by way of family reunions, humanitarian assistance and the 
encouragement of international cooperation with North Korea. 
Korean pan-nationalism is seen as the ROK's vision ofnationalism which 
inc1udes both North and South Korea. This is part of Korea's changing view of the nation 
and follows Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy. In addition, it accompanies an increasing 
anti-American sentiment. However, this new development in South Korean nationalism is 
48 
not without opposition. It has created a form of South-South conflict. Jiyul Kim describes 
it as a separation between the younger generation Of South Koreans who favour 'open' 
northern policies such as the 'Sunshine', who have no memory or experiences of the 
Korean War, and the older generation, who have had sorne direct effect of the War, many 
ofwhom harbour great anti-communist and anti-North Korean feelings. While these 
divisions are present within the ROK population, there is also conflict within the Korean 
government - particularly between the Conservatives and the Progressives. The 
Conservatives believe that democratisation of North Korea is the only way to achieve 
reunification. The Progressives, which are composed of labour groups, intellectuals, 
student groups, are said to give priority to peace and minjok (Korean nationalism) as a 
means for reunification. They see nationalism as more important than ideology. A new 
phase in Korean nationalism has arrived. Although Korean nationalism has always been 
solidified as a reaction to outside forces, Koreans are gradually becoming more consciolls 
of asserting their national pride in the absence of an external catalyst. 
Korean nationalism is a changing process constructed in response to the threat of 
the "Other". During the Joseon Period, Western Imperialism and Japanese colonisation 
were the catalyst for asserting Korean nationalism. The common goal of preserving 
Korean language, culture and history were the basis for defending it against external 
threats. Today, the idea of an imagined Korean nation constructed prior to the Division 
still remains, as do the reasons for unification. Both North and South Korea perce ive each 
other's political ideologies as a threat to the Korean nation. North Korea views the 
presence of American troops in the peninsula as a menace, while the South feels that Kim 
Il Sung's doctrine is a threat to Korean nationalism. The arrivai of saetomin in South 
Korea gives evidence to the presence of the Korean "Self' and "Other ," which has 
emerged as a result of prolonged separation and isolation between the two Koreas. The 
construction of a saetomin nation in the ROK calls for the re-examination of a newly 
imagined Korean nation. 
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Chapter III - Contending Korean Identities 
On the Korean peninsula, there are conflicting views between the North and South 
about what constitutes the Korean 'Self. It is also assumed that the citizens of each 
nation share their respective governments' created image of "Koreanness". Over the latter 
half of the 20th Century, increasing numbers of North Korean asylum seekers have made 
their way to the South. Based on the primordialist idea " ... that every person carries with 
him through life 'attachments' derived from place ofbirth, kinship relationships, religion, 
language, and social practices that are "natural" for him, peoples from the same 
background" (Hutchison & Smith 2001, 83), these asylum seekers often presume that 
they will easily adjust to life in South Korea. However, many suffer difficulties in 
adjusting to their new lives. They often feel that they are outsiders amongst their own and 
that that they shall always have this sense of "otherness". 
Even for those people, particularly in modern societies, who have been 
removed from their origins or have rejected their childhood identification, 
such as attachments may remain available in the unconscious to be revived by 
sorne appeal that strikes a sympathetic psychic chord (Hutchison & Smith 
2001, 83). 
As a result, there has been an emergence of a divided Korean nation between North 
Korean asylum seekers and South Korean 'nationals' present within South Korea. 
Since its establishment in 1948, the South Korean government has created an 
identity of 'Self in contrast to the North Korean 'Other'. In fact, both North and South 
Korean governments have sought to develop separate national identities based on the 
same Korean traditions. While ideological differences between the North and South have 
always existed, the sociological distinctions have come to be established after the Korean 
War. They were first evident in the 1960s and 1970s during the Park Chung Hee era. 
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Since then, a growing ideological and sociologica) divergence between the DPRK and the 
ROK has occurred resulting from South Korea's r~lpidly developing open economy and 
North Korea's lack of basic supplies to sustain its population. Despite the contrast 
between the two nations and the fact that both governing parties on either side of the 38th 
parallel claim that there is no real difference between them, there are several indicators 
that suggest otherwise. 
In this chapter, the construction of South Korean national identity is studied 
through three elements: the news media, elementary school textbooks and national 
symbols, in which the latter includes the study of national exhibits and the celebration of 
Korean Liberation Dayl. The reason for choosing these particular indicators is that the 
media are often used by the South Korean government (Grinker 1998, xii) to control or at 
least influence the thoughts and actions of its citizens based on the type of society it 
wishes to create. School curriculum, which is developed under the guidelines of the 
govemment, has been viewed by the South Korean govemment as a medium to influence 
young minds for creating 'good citizens', which includes sharing its views on North 
Korea and its people. The manner in which a government chooses to present a particular 
national symbol, as weil as its selection, provides an underlying message of how the state 
wishes its citizens to identify themselves, and this manifests itself in schooJ textbooks. 
In this chapter, we examine the way in which South Koreans identify themselves 
through national symbols, as influenced by their perception of North Koreans. The 
purpose here is to demonstrate that the South Korean govemment has been developing a 
national identity in reaction to its North Korean 'Other'. In doing so, it seeks to influence 
its citizens' opinion .of North Korea and its people through the media, education and 
1 Liberation Day is sometimes referred to as Independence Day, since it is the celebration of Korea's 
Independence from Japanese colonial rule. 
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national symbols. Since national identity is said to be dependent on the existence of its 
opposition (Grinker 1998,24), South Korean nali0nal identity is constructed through 
difference (Hall in Chung 2004, 108). Significant changes in government often result in 
efforts for societal changes. On the social level, the media, education and national 
symbols have generally been a representation of the official national identity in South 
Korea (Chung 2004, 105). It is through these elements that South Korean identity is 
examined, beginning with a look at the ROK news media. 
The South Korean News Media 
The South Korean press has had a long history of govemment control and 
repression (Chang 2004, 117). The South Koreangovernment believed that it had a dut y 
to filter the news that was reaching its citizens in the name of social responsibility and as 
a measure for national security. Since newspapers have had a profound influence on the 
consciousness of a society over its decades of authoritarian and military rule, the ROK 
govemment has prohibited the printing of stories criticizing it and of any articles 
supporting the opposition. Censorship was also placed on stories about North Korea until 
1993, when South Korea's first civilian government relaxed its control over the news 
media, thus al10wing for a certain degree of freedom of the press in the country. 
The South Korean press is said to have two main characteristics: one that is anti-
Communist and another that is nationalistic. As a more "progressive" government is in 
place in South Korea, while the anti-Communîst tone of the Korean press may not be as 
strong, the nationalistic2 character is still apparent. Although the conservative government 
censored news that did not conform to their ideology, Roh Mun Hyun's liberal 
2 The tem1 nationalistic character in this context is meant to be one that is in support of the government's 
vision of the South Korean nation. 
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government's efforts restricted the circulation of Korea's major conservative newspapers 
for criticizing the government of its "lax" policy 1<iwards North Korea in implementing of 
the "Sunshine Policy" and of its lack of effective economic policies. 
The purpose ofthis section is to demonstrate the general image of North Korean 
asylum seekers, as portrayed in the South Korean press. The articles studied are those 
found in the bi-monthly publications of Korea Focus, a periodical published by the Korea 
F oundation3, for the purpose of providing information to the international community on 
Korean CUITent events. These publications consist of English translations of articles found 
in major South Korean daily newspapers and monthly and quarterly journals. Despite the 
fact that Korea Focus is meant for foreign readers, the articles are, nonetheless, widely 
available to South Koreans in its original language. 
The South Korean Press 
Intellectuals and the government have always been involved in the Korean press. 
lt has been subject to censorship either by the ruling elite or by foreign forces. In the early 
years of its inception, the Korean press served as a revolutionary tool for resistance 
against foreign forces from the West, then from its Japanese colonizers. During the 
formative years of the South Korean government, the United States had a significant 
influence in deterrnining the content of Korean newspapers until Park Chung Hee became 
president. Although there have been changes for a freer press in Korea, critics state that 
"the change in the Korean media scene has not been a fundamental change" (Kim 1994, 
9). 
3 The Korea Foundation was established by the South Korean government in 1997, under the 'Korea 
Foundation Law'. The Foundations central purpose is to create an interest in Korean Studies amongst 
foreigners through various programs and international exchanges. 
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Between 1945 and 1993, free press was virtually non-existent. It was believed that 
the nation had to rebuild itself above aIl else ev en ilt the cost of freedom of the press, 
which was perceived as a threat to the fragile South Korean nation. The most significant 
figure in regulating news media was Park Chung Hee, who expressed his vision for the 
Korean press in his speech on Newspaper Day in 1966, emphasising the importance of 
responsible journalism; and declaring that since journalists had an influence on the 
masses, they should carefully consider the effects their stories would have on Korean 
society. As a fragile nation, Park declared the need for Koreans to unite to achieve their 
goal of modernisation and reunification: 
In seeking freedom and equality, progress and prosperity, 
the press should sacrifice its own interests and destiny for those of 
the nation and, through radical self-criticism of its basic posture, 
seek a new course of action in order to cope with the historic 
reality (Park 1966, 100 in Shin, 1970). 
In 1987, the Korean press was 'liberalised' when President Roh Tae Woo 
abolished the Basic Press Law4 and announced that, "[N]o restriction should be imposed 
on the press except when national security is at risk" (Lee 1999,435). This included 
permission to report about North Korean artists and musicians and increased reporting on 
political-military relations and activities of dissident organisations. 
Since the establishment ofthe ROK's tirst civilian government in 1993, the press 
has enjoyed relative freedom in its reporting of sensitive nature concerning r-Jorth Korea. 
Following a liberal government marked by Kim Dae Jung, his successor, Roh Tae Woo, 
4 The Basic Press Act, 1980: "one of the most restrictive and comprehensive laws in capitalistic societies.' 
Article: 3.2: The press shall perform its public duties by contributing to the formation of democratic public 
opinions concerning matters of public interest by means ofnews reports, commentary, and other methods; 
3.4: "The press shaH not encourage or praise violence and other illegal actions which disrupt public order. 
(Lee 1999,435). 
has allowed for the emergence of numerous independent dailies and left-Ieaning news 
sources. While the South Korean press is more diverse, it is not without restrictions. 
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The inter-Korean summit that took place in Pyongyang in 2000 highlighted 
several issues of concem to the South Korean press. While in the past, it was not seen 
favourably to write about North Korea in a positive light, this meeting raised opposite 
concems. In order to honour the principles of the Sunshine Policy, there was concem 
about being too critical of North Korea in their policies and human rights violations. The 
North Korean government also exercised its influence over the South Korean media when 
it ordered a reporter from the Joong-Ang Ilbo to be relieved from his coverage of the 
North-South family reunification for having used offensive language towards the DPRK 
govemment. He had described one of the North Koreans partaking in the reunion as a 
man who had been abducted the word "abducted" was seen as offensive by the North. 
The structure of the Korean press today remains the same, but the contents have 
changed. The media still reflects the govemment's stand on certain issues - particularly 
on North Korea. However, the difference is that opposition to the liberal govemment is 
permitted. Wh en the three largest newspapers in Korea do so, the govemment does not 
seem to have much support. The present govemment of Kim Dae Jung, whose policy 
towards North Korea is a more cooperative approach, was criticized by the press for 
being a Communist sympathizer and, thus, detrimental to the national security of South 
Korea. Kim Dae Jung's visit to North Korea in 2000 was said to be illegal under the 
National Security Law, which still remains in place. 
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The South Korean Media and North Korea 
As with its control over education, the South Korean government has had 
influence over the stories toid in its newspapers and news broadcasts. Although 
government control subsided in 1987, 'suggestions' and comments made by political 
leaders still have much influence. Consequently, the North Korean 'Other' portrayed by 
the South Korean media remains an illustration of the government's policy, which is 1110St 
often preoccupied with national security concerns. While in the past, this generally meant 
the North's threat ofusing nuclear weapons against the South, in recent years, the large 
numbers of North Korean asylum seekers arriving in South Korea have raised much 
anxiety. 
The North Korean 'Other' is perceived as irrational and underdeveloped, in 
imminent danger of sudden implosion (Chung 2000, 107-] 08). They are often reported to 
use military threat as a bargaining tool for international aid. "The media see North Korea 
as an essentially 'defunct 'nation that is 'unlikely' to survive for very long" (Chung 2000, 
108). The newspapers tend to use the tactic of alienation in order to draw attention to the 
contrast between the abundantly wealthy South and the impoverished North. Images of 
the South Korean 'Self" emphasise the fact that "South Korea is an 'economically rich' 
and 'well-developed' country" (Chung 2000, 110), that has the role of 'rescue' through 
tinancial assistance and food relief programmes. 
White efforts such as Kim Dae Jung's 'Sunshine Policy' have been adopted to 
encourage a more peaceful approach towards the North, fort Y years of anti-Cornmunist 
'indoctrination' is difficult to expunge. As a result, it is believed that even progressive 
South Korean leaders must "daim an anti-CommunÎst position in order to win trust from 
the South Korean public. [Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine] policy has been criticised for its 
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supposedly opening up of South Korean society te ideas of communism" (Chung 2000, 
113). As a result, thé media reports South Korea' s national identity based on anti-
Communist ideology and the repudiation of the 'Other', which are similar to Park Chung 
Hee's policies, rather than focussing on creating an identity independent of its North 
Korean counterpart. 
In recent years, articles in the more conservative newspapers such as the Chosun 
llbo have developed a softer tone when referring to North Korean refugees. The articles 
seem to be more factual than emotional. More sympathy towards the refugees may be 
perceived as another way of expressing disdain for the North Korean government. The 
ever- increasing number ofrefugees from the North represents a failure in the NOlih 
Korean system, for the fact that North Koreans are no longer leaving for simply 
ideological reasons, but in search of food and other basic hum an necessities. However, 
the same openness does not necessari1y apply when reporting on the Northern 
governrnent. Following the 2000 inter-Korean summit, there was sorne mixed reaction 
about the issue. The more liberal press were optimistic about the meeting, whi1e the 
Chosun Ilbo stated: "[r]ather than improving North-South relations, the government's 
policy has served only to increase the number of provocations by the North, and if the 
government fails to make a decisive move, the vicious cycle of incursions will continue" 
(Snyder 2002, 26). This reaction was shared by the more conservative and sceptical 
Korean population. 
Over the years, South Koreans' perception of North Korea and reunification has 
changed. Although part ofthis is due to the changes in Korean society, there are 
conflicting views on the issue, which is most evident between the older and younger 
Korean population. While the older generation, who have experienced first-hand the 
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atrocities of the Korean War, still carries feelings df distrust and animosity towards North, 
the younger generation, to whom the Korean War is a distant memory in their nation's 
history, is more receptive to the idea of cooperation with the North. However, the latter 
tend to see North Koreans as people from another country, rather than a people belonging 
to the same group as they. The difference, at present, is that there are sometimes opposing 
views on the way things should be dealt with although the desired end result is the same. 
This difference of opinion represents, not only a freer press in South Korea, but the 
presence of opposition government parties in South Korea. 
South Korean Newspapers and North Korean Defectors 
There are two main images of North Korea that these articles highlight: one of 
South Korea's strength over the North as their dut y to help by providing humanitarian 
assistance, and one of suspicion, where the public is wamed to be careful of North 
Korean defectors, lest the y be spies. 
The articles on North Korean refugees appear to send the message that while the 
South Korean governrnent recognizes it as their dut y to their northem brethren to provide 
assistance in their time of need, their arrivaI in the southem half of the 38th parallel is Ilot 
encouraged. As it is shown in the other sections ofthis chapter, South Korea has a 
dilemma with regards to North Koreans. 
From 1993 to 2006, there were only 9 articles found in the Korea Focus which 
directly addressed the issue of North Korean refugees or defectors. The first article, 
originally published on May 24, 1996 in the Seoul Shinmun5, a traditionally govemment-
funded newspaper, is about the defection of an officer in the North Korean Air Force. The 
5 Unless indicated otherwise, ail references made to newspaper articles in this section are those found in 
Korea Focus. 
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article suggests that since a member of the North ~:orean elite has defected6, it is a sure 
sign that the North is in a severe state of deterioration and that its collapse is fast 
approaching. This is suggestive of the ide a that South Korea is indeed stronger than the 
North and the fact that one oftheir high-ranking Pàrty members chose to defect, in a way, 
legitimizes South Korea as the true Korean nation 7. 
Legitimacy of the South Korean state is further highlighted in the news coverage 
of the defection of a member of North Korea's core elite. In 1997, Hwang Jang-yop, 
number 21 on North Korea's government hierarchy, sought asylum at the South Korean 
Embassy in Beijing. As one of the architects of North Korea's Juche Ideology (Kim 1997, 
37), Hwang's defection suggests that the Juche, North Korea's guiding ideology of self-
reliance, is nothing more than an illusion. In the March 1997 issue of the Monthly 
Donghwa, an article written by th en Professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and 
National Security, states that Hwang's defection is an affirmation that North Korea is 
politically and economically weak and that loyalty is no longer imminent in the DPRK 
ruling class. It is also further validation of the ROK as the legitimate Korean state, for 
Hwang Jang-yop expressed that his motivation for seeking asylum in South Korea was to 
" ... de vote the rest ofhis life to preventing war and promoting reconciliation and 
unification" (Kim 1997, 37-38). The fact that the creator of the basis of North Korea's 
legitimacy no longer believes in it, nor the government that implements it, was perceived 
as a symbol of the strength of the ROK over the DPRK- an image that has been promoted 
by the southern government since its establishment. 
6 Fighter pilots are considered members of the elite in North Korea, who have access to special privileges 
that the general population does not. 
7 Since 1948, when the DPRK and the ROK were established, both countries have had a rivalry about which 
is the 1egitimate Korean state. The question of legitimacy is one of the main driving forces of the 
competition between North and South Korea. This issue is also mentioned in Social Studies primary school 
textbooks. 
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The articles from the late 1990s focussed on the need to send humanitarian aid to 
North Korea. In an editorial from the Chosun Ilbo, dated May 7, 1996 (Korea Focus 1996 
] 25), citizens and civil society are encouraged to provide assistance to the DPRK and to 
speak out against the Human Rights violations in the North. Since the ROK government 
must "keep silent on certain matters for the sake of diplomacy" (Korea Focus 1996, 125), 
it caBs upon the dut y of South Korean citizens to help their northern brethren. The desire 
for helping North Koreans is encouraged. In another editorial found in the June 12, 1996 
issue of the Dong-a Ilbo, on the announcement of South Korea' s participation in the 
United Nations World Food Pro gram to help the starving DPRK citizens, there is a sense 
ofreluctance for the ROK's involvement. It stipulates that South Korea's contribution is 
more 'symbolic' th an anything and that it is unavoidable for them to get involved, as not 
helping their brethren would be 'sinful' and go against their moral obligation to provide 
aid (Korea Focus 1996, 119). The sense of obligation originates from the belief that 
Korea will be unified one day and that providing humanitarian assistance is a contribution 
to the cause. In the latter article, aid is given more out of dut y rather than true desire. One 
of the reasons for this is that security matters are still of great con cern when dealing with 
North Korea. 
While North Koreans are recognized by the ROK as 'brothers' in need and, thus, 
feel the dut y to provide basic aid, politically, the rationale advocates exercising caution 
when dealing with North Korean refugees; as the war is still not over, there is still a high 
probability of espionage. In 1997, Hwang, the defector who had once been a member of 
North Korea's elite, confirmed that since the mid-1980s, there have been 50 000 spies and 
collaborators working in South Korea (Korea Focus 1996, 119). In an article From the 
Dong-a Ilbo from December 2004, written by the former Ambassador from the South 
6] 
Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it states, "[t]he possibility that North Korean 
defectors in the South may be conducting espionage for the Pyongyang regime, which 
most people do not want to believe, seems to be a teality that we must face up to" (Kim 
1996, 6). In August of the same year, the Chosun llbo printed an article, which noted the 
South Korean govemment's concem for organizations dealing with North Korean 
defectors. They called the attention ofNGOs to exercise caution in their activities, since 
there is a possibility that sorne North Koreans may be spies. This scenario illustrates the 
dilemma faced by the South Korean govemment's identification with the North. NGOs 
are encouraged to help North Korean defectors, since they are considered to be members 
of the South Korean 'Self', yet at the same time, precautions are in order in case the 
belligerent North Korean 'Other' makes its presence known. 
Synthesis of North Korean Defectors in the South Korean Press 
There are few articles in the Korea Focus about North Korea - in particular, North 
Korean refugees. Since the periodical is a govemment-influenced publication, the 
presence or lack of articles on the subject can be used as an indicator of the ROK 
govemment' s stance on the issue. The results suggest that although the South Korean 
govemment acknowledges the dilemmas surrounding North Korean refugees, it is 
reluctant to place too much emphasis on the issue due to its sensitive nature in relation to 
national security and diplomatie concems. 
Recent reporting of North Korean issues has replaced the Cold War hard-line 
approach of ardent anti-Communism and suspicion of North Koreans, to a softer one that 
calls attention to the human side of the matter. While the method of presentation has 
differed, in both the Co Id War and post-Cold War eras, the underlying image of North 
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Korea has remained same. The Communist regime in the DPRK is still seen as unpleasant. 
Evidence ofthis are the defectors of the North's elite, who lived in luxury in Kim Il 
Sung's Korea; however, following the collaps~ of the Soviet Union, the asylum seekers' 
arrivai from the North is perceived as proofthat lifè in the DPRK has become even more 
difficult. The message, with respect to the Korean nation, has not changed. North Korea 
is still a part of the whole Korean nation and must be 'rescued' from Communism. The 
increasing presence of saetomin has reinforced South Korean hegemony, and South 
Korea sees itself as a 'big brother' and caretaker for the North. 
Identification with North Koreans and North Korea, as demonstrated in the South 
Korean press, is twofold: there is a sentimental connection in which North Koreans are 
included as part of the South Korean 'Self, and the realpolitik approach, which identifies 
North Koreans as the untrustworthy 'Other'. Although the ideal scenario would be to 
have unit y among North and South Koreans, it is the label of the 'Other' that most often 
presides, reminding people that Korea is still officially at war, and North Korea is its 
enemy. These conflicting views are present in South Korean textbooks, which are 
explored in the next section. 
Education 
The previous section presented an analysis of how the South Korean government 
controlled its written news media to influence its citizens' perceptions of North Korea and 
its people. Regardless of the sentimental argument that North and South Koreans are one 
in the same due to their common lineage, the construction of the image of the North 
Korean 'Other' attests to the notion that Koreans living on either side of the 38th parallel 
have become alienated from one another. 
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The purpose ofthis section is to examine how North Korea and North Koreans are 
portrayed in South Korean textbooks and to determine any differences there may be in 
their representation between the texts published over an evolution of time from 1979 to 
2006 and to also study how this imagery of North Korea and its habitants transcends in 
defining South Korean national identity. The South Korean govemments' portrayal of the 
North Korean 'Other' is analyzed through the study of elementary school textbooks. 
Textbooks used in South Korean public schools are carefully chosen by the Ministry of 
Education and are closely examined to ensure that the govemment's desired message is 
present. Any changes made are considered 'official,' since "aIl school textbooks are 
sponsored, edited, selected, and standardized by the Ministry of Education, [and] the 
views represented in the textbook are sanctioned by the govemment" (Grinker 1998, 135). 
The books are generaIly produced by the Ministry's office of curriculum development 
(Hyde 1988, 55)8 or by a publisher approved by the govemment. 
Since education is a most valued element in Korean society and is believed to be 
a major source of a child's morals, values and beliefs, the Korean government uses 
education to 'create' their ideal citizens and members of society. Consequently, textbooks 
and school curricula are often the product of guidelines given by politicians. According to 
K wan Chun Lee' s research and to the beliefs of sorne educators, it has often been 
concluded that what children leam in the classroom in school will most certainly stay 
with them throughout their adult lives and influence their thoughts and actions as 
members of society (Hart 2000, 143). What children are taught about North Korea and its 
g The Ministry of Education is divided into two main offices: the office for planning and management and 
the office for supervision and curriculum development. In each of the provinces in South Korea and in the 
major cities ofSeoul and Pusan, there is a Board of Education that oversees local school administration. 
Each Board is under the supervision ofthe Education Superintendent, who is recommended by the Minister 
of Education and appointed by the President (Hyde 1988, 55). 
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people will influence how the fonner identifies themselves as South Koreans and their 
sentiments towards North Koreans. These senti~ents are most likely to emerge when they 
encounter North Korean asylum seekers in the.ir own section of the 38th parallel. 
Education and Government in South Korea 
South Korean education has a highly political history. This is particularly true 
following the division of the Korean peninsula, when the teaching of anti-Communism 
could be found in the textbooks of almost every subject taught in schools. Korean 
presidents have used the education system as a way to strengthen their power and to 
exercise their control over Korean society. Since it is believed that the education system 
has a crucial role in maintaining political systems, it is not surprising that politicians 
would use it to create state loyalty and as a medium to diffuse messages. 
In 1948, Rhee Syngman used the education system to suppress the pro-
Communist and North Korean sympathizer groups present in the South. In the interest of 
national security, a fonn ofpatriot education was developed, using middle school and 
high school children to spread "national consciousness". South Korean youth were taught 
the essence of Confucian values, with an emphasis on 10yaIty and patriotism. These 
teachings were a way for the government to convince its people of the legitimacy of its 
authority. The central theme of moral education was anti-Communism, which was also 
found in Social Studies and history texts. Social Studies and Moral Education textbooks 
"explained democracy as involving a consciousness of order; thus, the dut y of citizens of 
democratic societies was to obey the nationallaws and rules ... " (Seth 2002, 207). 
The most prominent example of the use of education to promote government 
policy is that of the Park Chung Hee era (1961-1979). During this time, the government 
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used education to "indoctrinate citizens against communism, with an emphasis in North-
South axis of political antagonism ... " (Seth 2002, 72). This was done through astate 
established curriculum and textbooks written and published by the state, through which 
the idea of the North Korean 'Other' became more ingrained amongst young South 
Korean citizens. 
Park's archetype and successor, Chun Doo Hwan, continued the anti-Communist 
education policy during his presidency in his vigilance against North Korean 
Communism and his goal to "free young people from ideological contamination" (Seth 
2002,222). It was only in 1987, with the election of South Korea's first civilian president, 
that schools were given more autonomy in curriculum modification, as long as it 
conformed to the ideology of a democratic society. Although anti- Communism was still 
taught, its teaching methodology was less authoritative. South Korean political 
indoctrination was carried out with the screening of clips from North Korean films and 
programs, with added commentary and facts given by the instructor. 
Subsequent South Korean govemments have gradually reduced the amount of 
anti-Communist themes in textbooks, with increasing explanations of Liberal Democracy. 
As the ROK experienced democratization in the 1980s, there was no need for rigorous 
anti-Communist indoctrination, since it was no longer such a threat. Although one may 
still find sorne anti-Communist sentiment in South Korean textbooks, harsh anti-
Communist texts from schools were removed in 1997 in accordance with President Kim 
Dae Jung's policy to democratize education in South Korea. 
South Korea has had a history of using education as a political instrument. 
Evidence of this is clear during the authoritarian govemments of Rhee, Park and Chun, 
who used education to legitimise their own regime and to increase the influence and 
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control of the South Korean government over its own society (Seth 2002, 192). In 
addition, education was established in attempt to maintain state security in Korea. ln its 
recent efforts to promote peaceful unification, the South Korean government has 
reformed its curriculum by promoting the spirit of a united Korea and by minimising anti-
Communist teaching. The following sections on textbook analysis reveal that there is less 
hostility towards North Korea in the more recent readers, where emphasis is placed on 
unification based on democratic ideals. 
South Korea Primary School Textbooks 
In order to affirm South Korean government legitimacy, its school textbooks 
included negative images of the North Korean 'Other' in order to highlight this claim. 
The North Korean government is "painted as evil, deceitful, and threatening to children's 
well-being ... " (Hart 1999,4), while the South Korean government is described as 
positive, trustworthy and comforting. Stories in Moral Education texts describe North 
Koreans who terrorise South Koreans. Images of violence and fear are often linked to 
North Korean spies. Due to the fact that one does not know if one is dealing with a spy, 
as a precautionary measure, the message in the school texts is: North Koreans should not 
be trusted, for they are trained to be deceitful. 
Moral Education in South Korea was introduced in 1954 as a subject in primary 
and middle schools. Its goal was to promote nationalism, anti-Communism and general 
ethical norms for daily life (Helgesen 1998, 155), and it continues to be taught to the 
present day. It is an important source of information, since it "reveals the distilled image 
of the norms and values that the political authorities wish to inculcate in the younger 
generation" (Helgesen 1998, 158). Social Studies are similar to Moral Education in terms 
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of the values taught, but focus more on the physical aspects of society such as economy, 
geography and technology. Both subjects are essential guides to the government's 
interpretation of North Korea, as they are used by the government to teach the "correct" 
political attitudes (Helge sen 1998, 174). 
South Korean Textbooks and the Korean War 
The official outbreak of the Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when North 
Korean military tanks rumbled down the streets of Seoul, south of the 38th parallel (Mun 
Gyo Bu 1979, 145). This division between the North and South had been made in 1948, 
when each side established its respective governments. While North Korea states that the 
War was one of unification and the liberation of South Korea from foreign control, the 
ROK sees it as an invasion and a tactic to spread communism throughout the peninsula. 
There is a slight change in explanation for the causes of the Korean War in the textbooks. 
The less aggressive tone found in the books published in 2004 suggests the South Korean 
government's modified approach towards North Korea. 
The War was a pivotaI moment in history when both Korean governments began 
to openly identify itself in terms of the 'Other'. In South Korea, the Korean War, driven 
by Communist forces, is described as the evil that caused separation. This is particularly 
true of the images of North Korea found in South Korean textbooks published in the 
1970s. When it mentions the Korean War, the Social Studies book from 1979 refers to it 
as the 6.25 invasion (i.e. June 25, when the Korean War began). In this section, the 
Communist Party is mentioned as a reference to the North, but North Koreans are 
repeatedly referred to as 'them'. This is the first sign of 'humanising' North Koreans 
instead of just referring to something more abstract like the government, as was done 
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previously in the text. This mention of 'them' begÎlls a pretext for describing the War. lt 
highlights the fact that South Koreans did not expect the beginning of a war. They were 
completing daily tasks when they heard the sound ofmilitary tanks from North Korea in 
the streets. Following this image ofpeace, the section ends with a less 'peaceful' thought: 
the fact that it is now clear how evil 'they' really are (Mun Gyo Bu 1979, ] 51). Here, the 
word, 'evil,' is actually used to describe North Koreans. It implies that they are deceitful 
for having begun a war during a time of peace that was agreed to by both Korean 
governments9. This portrayal of deceitful North Koreans is found in the Moral Education 
text that is examined in the following section. 
The 2004 Social Studies textbook uses a more neutral terrn in referring to the 
incident of June 25, 1950 by describing it as the Korean War, instead of an 'invasion'. 
Credit is given to the United Nations and American military for their assistance in forcing 
the North Korean troops back above the demarcation line. It explains the destruction 
caused by war and how after 50 years, the emotional wounds caused by the War have yet 
to be healed. On this note, the text emphasizes the need for peaceful unification, so that 
the healing process may begin. This image of North Koreans in relation to unification 
seems to imply a 'oneness' between the two Koreas, and for a moment, it overlooks the 
fact that North Korea is its 'Other'. 
South Korean Textbooks and North Korea and North Koreans 
There have been sorne significant changes with reference to North Korea in the 
textbooks. The aggressive anti-Communist sentiments found in the earlier readers are 
replaced in the more recent period by a more sympathetic approach and emphasis on 
9 Prior to the Korean War, there had been guerrilla warfare in South Korea. From May to Oecember of 1949, 
there was heavy fighting at the 38th paralleJ, costing the lives of hundreds of Korean soldiers on either side. 
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efforts towards reunification. In the 1979 Social Studies textbook, there is no direct attack 
on North Koreans, but on the Communist govemment that rules them. North Koreans are 
described in the school reader as people who project the illusion of freedom and who are 
Jed to believe that they are working for the good of the nation, while in reality, it is for the 
good of one person - their leader, Kim Il Sung. Newspapers, magazines and broadcasts 
are aIl used to promote the Communist Party, as are aIl cultural events, literature and 
plays, which are said to be used to praise Kim Il Sung. Vivid images are given of North 
Koreans who live in poor and starving conditions. This is immediately followed by the 
statement that the North Korean government is continuously increasing its expenditure to 
prepare for invasion of peaceful South Korea: 
We all come from the same bloodline and share a common 
ancestor and culture; we are inherently part of the same nation. 
However, our ideology is different; the land is divided and suffers 
from the Communist invasion of June 25. Following the ceasefire, 
in North Korea, a large number of our [Communist] brethren have 
been deprived of their freedom and are used as instruments for a 
Communist form of unification (i.e. unification by force) . 
... [North Koreans] send spies, and during time ofpeace, dig a 
tunnel for a southem invasion; what is worse, an attempt to shoot 
and kill the [South Korean] President was made - it will be 
difficult to achieve peaceful unification [as a result of these events] 
(Mun Gyo Bu 1979, 154). 
This section of the Social Studies textbook describes what the future holds for 
North-South relations. It begins by highlighting the fact that Koreans on the peninsula all 
come from the same bloodline and share a common history and culture. This is the reason 
given to legitimise the need for reunification: once unification is achieved, Koreans can 
once again live peacefully. 
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A negative picture of North Koreans is illustrated to show that they do not wish 
for peaceful unification. The South Korean government has made efforts to reach out, but 
the offer has not been accepted. The word, brethren, is used to describe North Koreans, 
who together, suffer under the Communist party. It also mentions that the former are 
innocent victims who have been forced to comply with the latter. However, later on in the 
text, the term, 'they' is used in front of negative descriptions of the actions of the North 
Koreans. Despite this, the text is hopeful for a reunified Korea in the future, although it 
may be a difficult task to accomplish. It calls for the need for solidarity among Koreans, 
but it does not fail to mention that North Korea may once again invade South Korea. 
While the Social Studies textbook concentrated more on the negative aspects of 
North Korean communism, the Moral Education reader provided more explicit examples 
of the nature of the North Korean people: 
Thinking that it was their mother, the young mother answered the 
door. However, a wolf came through the door, eating up ail the 
little rab bits. As soon as the play was over, Sunam said ... "What a 
wretched person. The wolf is exactly like the Communists." The 
mother goes on to tell a story: " .. .It was during the time of the 
Korean Invasion. One day, the Communist leader approached 
your grandfather, offering him a job that would give him a lot of 
money and rice .... but it was ail a lie. He was locked up and a few 
days later, he was brought to the battlefield." The text goes on to 
say that "to this day, Communists still tell those kinds of lies." 
Following the story, Sunam drew something on a pie ce ofpaper. 
It was a picture of a young rabbit being eaten by a wolf. 
Underneath, it was c1early written, "Let us not believe the lies 
told by the Communists" (Moral Education, 1979 in Kim 200], 
38). 
The term 'wretched being' is used to de scribe the wolf, which the reader sees is a 
metaphor for North Koreans. The image of the 'Other' is used in two ways here: the 
vilifying of North Koreans by describing them as violent beings and the use of derogatory 
language to describ~ them. This language, which would be unacceptable for children to 
use, implies a sense of superiority of South Koreans over the North Koreans. 
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In the 2004 text, it is interesting to note that, when referring to unification, it states 
that as a result of 50 years' separation, that North Korea has become like another country 
(Daehan Gyogwaseo 2004c, 128), implying that North Korea had been a part of the South 
Korean nation. It mentions that immediately following division, North and South Korea 
regarded each other as hostile enemies and developed its military and foreign policy vis-
à-vis the 'Other'. 
It also explicitly states that as a result ofprolonged separation, that NOlih and 
South Koreans have become different from one another in speech, ideology, music, dance, 
and lifestyle. As a result ofthese changes, there is urgency for unification before the 
differences become even larger. Contrary to the 1979 texts, the emphasis is placed on 
cultural rather than political elements for unification. Despite the cultural differences 
between North and South Korea, the book states, " ... because from the beginning (of 
history) our country was one nation, we must be unified" (Daehan Gyogwaseo 2004c, 
132). 
In the Moral Education textbooks from 1989-1996, South Korean children are 
instilled with the message that unification is essential for the success and well-being of all 
Koreans and the Korean nation, which inevitably includes those living in the NOlih. As an 
introduction to the les son on North Koreans, the children are asked to list the similarities 
between North and South Koreans. While a list including language, appearance, customs 
and food are provided, the differences, whi1e the y are mentioned, are not discussed in 
great detail. The texts in 1990 encourage the school children to include their North 
Korean 'Other' as a part of the South Korean 'Self. In the fifth and sixth grade Moral 
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Education books, children are taught to forget about aIl the misgivings and hatred of the 
past and to begin loving North Koreans because they are part oftheir family. lt is stated 
that in preparation for unification, they must work hard to understand North Koreans and 
to learn to trust one another. These images of North Koreans are a stark contrast to the 
ones taught during the Cold War. It reflects the South Korean government's change from 
a hard-line policy towards North Korea to a more soft-line one. 
Synthesis o.fSouth Korean Textbooks and National Identity 
In the textbooks published in both periods, the image of the North Korean 'Other' 
is still present. However, the manner in which information is presented has changed. The 
Social Studies text from 1979 refers to North Koreans as brethren to be saved from the 
evil Communists, portraying an image that differentiates between the North Korean 
Communists and the general North Korean population who are presented as having no 
freedom ofthought under Kim Il Sung's dictatorship. In the Moral Education textbook 
published in 1979, this distinction is not made. AlI North Koreans are referred to using 
derogatory terms, thus alienating North and South Koreans from each other. In the texts 
published after 1994, North Koreans are presented more sympathetically. There is a softer 
tone, but there is still an anti- sentiment. Greater focus is placed on democratisation and 
the urgency for peaceful unification. 
There have been considerable changes in the textbooks, which reflect official 
changes and governri1ent views. In both periods, there seems to be a paradox in defining 
Korean identity. Both identify with the concept of the North Korean 'Other,' but at the 
same time, they include the 'Other' as a part of the South Korean 'Self, which is evident 
in the sections on unification. Unification is desired because of the common history and 
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blood ties shared between the two nations, but on the other hand, the differences between 
the two are thoroughly highlighted, since anti-Com'munism is still present in the more 
recent textbook. This is the difference between the two periods: the 1979 textbooks 
portray the 'Other' in terms ofpolitical and economic differences and with great hostility, 
while in the later period, it is defined in terms of culture. Children are being taught the 
cultural and linguistic differences between North and South Koreans. NOlih Koreans are 
more 'humanised', unlike in the past when they were 'demonised'. Despite a more 
'amicable' official policy towards North Koreans, the effect of rigorous anti-Communist 
teachings of those educated in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s, who are now in 
their 30s and 40s, would most likely have had sorne influence on their views towards 
North Koreans, subsequently affecting their encounters with North Korean asylum 
seekers living in South Korea. 
The textbook analysis does not explain the source of aIl South Koreans' beliefs 
and national identity. However, it provides a general idea of the shared nationalism that 
exists - one that the ROK government wishes for them to have. Although they are 
supposed to constitute a part of the Korean 'Self, the textbook analysis shows that North 
Koreans continue to be considered as the South Korean 'Other'. In aIl its efforts to create 
a negative image of the North Korean 'Other', South Korea has yet to fully develop its 
own national identity. This identity is dependent on its opposition ofthe 'Other'. Since 
Hs establishment, the ROK has been concerned with protecting itself from North Korea; it 
has devised policies and taken action based on what the North did, eventually defining its 
existence in opposition to the DPRK. This may be seen as a negative nationalism, where 
fear and threat are the reasons for government legitimacy and offer safety from a worse 
alternative. Although the more recent textbooks have abandoned anti- messages, the 
message of a distinctive South Korean 'Self still remains. 
National Symbols 
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National symbols are important elements used to define the identity of a particular 
group. In relation to nation states, they are often regarded as sacred representations, which 
unify its people. The most common state symbols are the flag and the national anthem. ln 
South Korea, the national flag is considered sacred. Flags can be found in almost every 
classroom. Students begin the school day by saluting the flag and singing the national 
anthem. State rituals such as the celebration of certain national holidays and the 
construction of memorial sites are other forms of national symbols, which are often used 
by the state to transmit a collective historical memory to the present population. 
The purpose of this section is to explain how selected national symbols in South 
Korea have been established to reflect the nation's identity. The symbols chosen are three 
types ofmemorials found in the ROK. The first is the presentation of the Korean War 
Memorial, the second, a museum dedicated to commemorating Korea's war history and 
the third is the celebration of August 15, which commemorates Korean Liberation. 
The first national symbol examined here is the Korean War Memorial, where the 
focus is on the area concerning the display of the "Statue ofTwo Brothers". The second, a 
study of the exhibit on North Korean Daily Life, held in June and July 1993, is a form of 
memorial also to be studied. Organised by the Korean Ministry of Education, the purpose 
ofthis display was to show South Koreans that North Koreans are not alien beings, but 
are very mu ch like them, in efforts to promote Korean unification in South Korea. The 
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ROK government, by showing everyday objects used in North Korea, hoped to erase the 
evil image of North Koreans that many were taught to believe as school children. 
The third symbol examined is the celebration of Korea's liberation from Japanese 
occupation in 1945. This is the only national holiday that both North and South Korea 
celebrate. While traditionally, both states had celebrated this occasion independently from 
one another, in recent years, in order to promote Korean unit y, efforts have been made to 
hold joint celebrations. These festivities not only represent the affirmation of both Koreas 
to a shared historical event, but are evidence of a progression in the changes of the ROK 
government's changing views on the commemoration of certain unpleasant parts of 
history and in the necessity of its recognition to move forward in the process of Korean 
unification. 
The Korean War Memorial 
Until recently, images of the Korean War were not easily found in South Korea. 
People rarely saw pictures of the destruction of the War, with the exception of the limited 
images found in museums. In general, there are not many monuments or memorials in 
South Korea, which commemorate the Korean War. One reason for this is that the War is 
technically not over, since no peace treaty was ever signed. It is also an event that 
Koreans are not proud of. Memorializing the War would be an acknowledgement of 
division as the final state of the peninsula, shattering the hopes for reunification of the 
Korean peninsula (Grinker 1998, 30). In addition, public sentiment was that a memorial 
"would demean the Korean heritage by glorifying war and the military" (Grinker 1998, 
30). South Koreans have yet to mourn the effects of the Korean War. Grinker states that 
in order for this process to begin, either unification must take place, or it must be accepted 
that Korea's destiny is one of permanent division. The commemoration of the War 
materialises the past and compartmentalises il, sinc.e 
[m]onuments about loss also package the past concretely-
one can, quite literally, walk away from them- and thus provide 
the possibility to break with the past even as their monumental 
form is sacred; they simultaneously mark both a merger of the 
present and future (Grinker 1998, 31). 
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Located in Seoul, South Korea, the War Memorial was cornpleted and opened to 
the public in 1994. Roh Tae Woo JO, the ROK president who envisioned the project, had 
originally dreamed of building one large museum dedicated to the Korean War. The final 
product is the commemoration of Korea's war legacy dating back to the period of the 
Three Kingdoms Il, with a section on the Korean War. This project was met with sorne 
opposition from the South Korean public - more specifically, the dissident intellectuals 
who saw it as nothing more than the authoritarian government's tactic for establishing 
legitimacy. It was even described as "an illegitimate child that should never have seen 
the light of day" (Lee as in Jager 2002,393). The War Memorial was, in fact, built to 
link family and nation, blood lineage and state legitimacy, as weIl as to create a patriotic 
and unanimous image of Korean military history. 
Outside the War Memorial, there is a statue called "The Statue of Brothers", a 
monument of two Korean soldiers embracing each other (See Appendix 1 a & 1 b). Slight 
differences in the stature of the men can be seen. One is bigger than the other, and the 
smaller one is looking up at the bigger one. This statue is a representation of South 
10 Roh Tae Woo was a former general hand-picked by his predecessor and friend, General Chun 000 Hwan, 
as President of the ROK. He was president from 1988-1993. 
1 J The period of the Three Kingdoms marks the beginning of 'modern' Korean history. The three kingdoms 
were Goguryeo. Baekje and Sil/a, which were in continuous rivalry until 668, when the peninsula was 
unified. 
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Korean identity in terms of the' Self and 'Other', as it depicts several opposing images 
symbolising how the ROK government identifies the nation and its people. The bigger 
soldier is the oIder brother who has finally been united with his brother and has accepted 
the responsibility of guiding and protecting the younger sibling, under the auspices of 
Democracy. The older sibling represents the South Korean 'Self who has finally been 
reconnected with its North Korean 'Other'. This is the message about North Koreans that 
children are taught in school- that unification must be achieved, so that the South 
Koreans can 'save' and 'protect' their northem brethren. 
In an interview between Sheila Jager and the statue's sculptor, Choi Young-jeep, 
it is remarked that the older (South Korean) has a weapon, while the younger (North 
Korean) does not. This symbolises the defenceless younger soldier and the "defeat of 
Communism and the victory of Democracy" (Jager 2002, 406). Mr. Choi highlights 
another reason for this symbol, which can also be found in sorne school children's 
textbooks. He sees it as a message that the "South is prepared for war, should the nation 
be provoked again" (Jager 2002, 406). 
The War Memorial conceptualises the image of the Korean War and North 
Koreans that is represented by the government that commissioned its inception. It is a 
form ofreconstructed memory, and it refers back to the perception and knowledge at the 
time of its construction (Assman as in Wierling 1997, 174). It is consistent with the image 
of North Korea that is taught in schools, an image which is controlled by the same 
govemment. In the next memorial studied, the ambivalence of Korean identity is revealed 
through the reactions of the South Koreans who attended the exhibit on North Korean 
Every Day Life. 
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The Exhibit on North Korean Every Day Lijè 
In general, many South Koreans say thafthey don't really know much about the 
North Korean people beyond the Juche poli tics. Sorne even say that they have difticulty 
imagining their appearance. North Koreans are generally viewed as people who have no 
freedom ofthought and behaviour and as people who live in an uncivilized, backward 
manner, those caught in a time warp. However, they are sometimes seen as an example of 
the primordial Korean, with no signs ofhaving been tainted by the effects of globalisation. 
Many South Koreans entered the exhibit on North Korean Everyday Life with these 
images of the Northerners in mind. 
Anthropologist Roy Grinker conducted a study on the display of North Korean 
artefacts in Seou), South Korea. He observed people who attended the exhibit in addition 
to surveying them on their thoughts of the display. Many were intrigued, for this was a 
rare opportunity that the South Korean government had presented to its citizens. 
Displayed in a department store in Seoul in June and July 1993, the exhibit, which moved 
to a more permanent location in Daejon, was organized with the help of North Korean 
defectors who lived in South Korea. It was part of the Korean Ministry ofUnification's, 
"let's get to know the true picture of North Korean movement". The purpose was to 
promote a sense of common hum an it y between North and South Koreans in preparation 
for unification. 
There was a display of a model apartment, posters, books, canned goods, batteries 
and about 2000 everyday objects, which was the main attraction. The objects included: a 
toothbrush, knives, chopsticks, dishes, a telephone ... (Grinker 1998, 57). People thought 
that the objects were different from the ones found in South Korea, even though this was 
not the case. The perception was that North Koreans lived parallel lives which were 
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replicas of South Korea's past. This idea that South Korea is the more advanced nation, 
whose strength is measured according to the reSources that one possesses, is comparable 
to the image ofthe Statue of Brothers from the War Memorial, where the bigger, stronger 
sibling is to take care of the weaker one. HoweveL in addition to these daily artefacts, at 
the end of the exhibit, there was a screening of a film on the lives of Kim Il Sung and 
Kim Jong Il. Emphasis was placed on the North's numerous human rights violations and 
acts of international terrorism. It seems that while the ROK government wanted to 
generate a sense ofkinship with the Koreans in order to promote unification, it wanted to 
ensure that people realised it should be done under a democratic government. As with 
other symbols of Korean identity, contradictions can be found - while there was a sense of 
pride in homogeneity, there was also an acknowledgement of difference between North 
and South Koreans. The display of Korean lineage and shared history is exemplified in 
the recent joint Liberation Day celebrations discussed in the next section. 
Korean Liberation Day 
On August 15, 2005, North and South Korea jointly celebrated the 60 th 
anniversary of Korean Liberation from Japanese occupation. It was the fourth occasion in 
which both states had celebrated this occasion together. Although both North and South 
Korea share the Liberation and Restoration holiday, this is also the day in 1948, (three 
years following the end of Japanese occupation in Korea), that the government of the 
Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established. August 15 is not only a symbol of 
'liberation,' but also of separation. As with other elements of Korean identity, this day is 
one that bears the meaning of two opposing images. 
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There is no definitive answer as to why August 15 was chosen as ROK foundation 
day; one may assume that the intention was to sy'mbolise the South Korean government as 
the legitimate heir to Korean liberation. Over several years, on the occasion that was 
intended to show renewed freedom and Koreans' reclamation of control over their own 
destiny, it has become a day for remembering the past and for competing against political 
supremacy between the two Korean governments (Jung 2005,6). 
During his presidency in the 1970s, Park Chung Hee used the symbolic occasion 
of Liberation Day to initiate open dialogue for reconciliation with North Korea. While 
there was no substantial progress made, both governments sent messages for unification 
and acknowledgement to one another, on the Liberation Day holiday. As a result of 
President Kim Dae Jung's visit to Pyongyang in 2000, an agreement was made between 
the two states to ho Id joint Liberation Day celebrations. Political differences are supposed 
to be set aside for the event and emphasis is supposed to be placed on the homogeneity 
between North and South Koreans, through cultural performances from both members of 
both states and in the organisation of various sports tournaments. As was the purpose of 
the display on North Korean Daily Life, the ROK government wished to show its citizens 
that North Koreans are not different from them. In the promotion of unit y and solidarity, 
this event is used as an opportunity to create inter-Korean dialogue with South Korean 
civil groups, to hold discussion groups with their counterparts in addition to updating 
progress on joint cultural projects such as the "Large Korean Dictionary", which is an 
effort to standardise the Korean language in North and South Korea (MOU 2005b). North 
Korea has supported South Korea's discontentment with Japan's 
distortion ofhistorical events in Japanese schooltextbooks and on Japan's claim to the 
Dokdo islands, which it has expressed in the Liberation Day celebrations. 
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The Liberation Day celebrations of 2005 Wfre symbolic, since the passing of 60 in 
Korean culture signifies the completion of one life cycle and the start of a new one. For 
this reason, the 60th anniversary slogan was, "A NÇ?w Beginning". It was presented as the 
start of a new chapter in Korean history, based on a deep commitment to peaceflll 
unification, the pursuit of a Korean identity based on values ofhumanism, which were 
influenced by Korean tradition and to preserve the spirit of the pioneers of Korea's 
Gwangbok Movement 12 • The joint August 15 celebrations demonstrate a sense of 
convergence from both Korean governrnents towards lInity. In South Korea, the day is 
dedicated to festivities that honour Korean Independence. For a brief moment, this 
occasion aIlows for the temporary merging of the 'Self and 'Other' as one. 
Synthesis of National Symbols and National ldentity 
National symbols are 'invented' traditions; they enhance national pride and lInity. 
They are government-sponsored modem notions that have been disseminated through the 
educational system and the mass media to create and to promote a modem national 
community and are crucial in the nation-building process of Korea. 
Each of the three memorials chosen reveal~ the portrayal of the Korean 'Self in 
relation to the 'Other'. As in the previous sections, it demonstrates the paradox of Korean 
national identity. These national symbols aIl exemplify the South Korean government's 
interpretation of Korean identity. It is do ne through the promotion ofunification based on 
the argument that homogeneity with North Koreans is not only based on a shared history, 
but on a shared humanity. 
12 Gwangbok is the Korean term for' Liberation Day'. Literally translated, it means "great restoration", 
similar to a "Korean renaissance". 
ln recent years, through its influence over the media, school textbooks and 
î 
national memorials, the South Korean government has decreased the presence of anti-
Communism and has placed more stress on cultural aspects ofidentity. However, it is 
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clear that the ROK's desire for unification is based on democratic ideals in which it takes 
on the role as the older sibling responsible for the guidance and well-being of its North 
Korean family. The inference of this type of contention, transmitted to South Koreans, 
while do ne with good intentions, tends to have negative effects. ln its assumed role as the 
caretaker of North Koreans, the South Korean govemment sends a message that North 
Koreans do not have the capacity to be self-sufficient and independent, thus requiring 
'older brother's' help. The result is a shift in the Korean hierarchy, whereby ail North 
Koreans, regardless oftheir education and the skills they possess, are not on equal ground 
with South Koreans. As it will be shown, North Korean asylum seekers often feel that 
South Koreans look down on them, thus leading the former to experience anger and 
frustration. These effects are explored in the following chapters. 
Chapter IV - North Korean Migrants 
Chapter III illustrated the paradoxes of Korean national identity to show how the 
Korean 'Other' is presented through the South Korean media, education and national 
symbols. This chapter takes a closer look at the state of North Korean migrants before 
their arrivaI in the ROK. As it is stated in the South Korean Constitution, "[t]he territory 
of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands" 
(Yang 1999,964). This description, thus, includes North Koreans as citizens of the ROK. 
However, regardless ofwhat the official documents may indicate, saetomin often feel 
alien to life in South Korea. 
The majority of the saetomin who arrive in South Korea have spent sorne time in a 
third country, where they faced many hardships. The refugees' experiences in these 
countries, as weIl as their experiences during their journey to their final destination, often 
affect their integration into their country of settlement. With this regard, a study of the life 
of saetomin before their arrivaI in South Korea is important for understanding the reasons 
attributed to their success or failure oftheir integration into South Korean society. The 
purpose ofthis chapter is to provide background information about North Korean 
migrants by taking a look at their life once the y leave the North Korean borders and by 
considering the circumstances under which they choose to leave. While there are sorne 
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who seek asylum through Siberia and third countries in Southeast Asia and Mongolia, the 
focus here is on the saetomin in China, where tens ofthousands ofthem are believed to 
still reside. It is during their time in China that they stay anywhere From a few days up to 
a few years, that the decision is made to either move on and to embark on the dangerous 
journey to South Korea, or to live a life of exile in China, in hope that the living 
conditions in North Korea improve, so that they can return home. 
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The exact number of North Koreans who live in China is unknown since they live 
in hiding, trying very hard to blend into their sUlToundings, for fear of being repatriated. 
The numbers also fluctuate, with many returning either voluntarily or forcefully, and a 
small number going to third countries and South Korea. The Chinese government says 
that there are about 10 000, while the South Korean government estimates about 30 000, 
and various NGOs claim that there are anywhere between 100000-300000 saelomin in 
China (Seymour 2005, 16). 
North Korea 
In the year following Kim II Sung's death (1994), a series ofunfortunate events in 
North Korea curtailed the stability and Juche self-sufficiency that it prided itself of. As 
earlyas 1987, the DPRK's food production, which once surpassed the yield in South 
Korea, began to show signs of decline. The Public Distribution System (PDS), which 
distributed daily grain rations, was reduced by 10 percent in 1987 and by another 10 
percent in 1992. The previous year, the North Korean government had launched its "let's 
eat two meals a day" campaign as a strategy for rationing food. The reduction in rations 
applied to aIl citizens, except for the social elite, military personnel and heavy industry 
labourers (Noland 2003,9-10). 
In 1995, severe floods caused widespread famine in the DPRK, said to be the 
longest and the worst of aIl such phenomenon of the 20th Century (Goodkind and West 
200 1, 219). The famine was caused by a combination of natural and artificial factors, 
marking a significant moment in North Korea, not only because of its devastating effects, 
but because of the changing relations ofthat country with the international community. 
As a result of this devastation, the DPRK officially requested international food aid 
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through its UN Permanent Mission, to the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs 
(U1\TDHA), in 1995 (Choi 2004,87-88). The famine in North Korea prevailed, 
subsequently, with another severe flood in the summer of 1996, followed by a drought in 
1997, said to be the "worst drought in the century" - it has been correlated with El Nino 
(Ahn 2005, 3), destroying reservoirs and drying up irrigation systems. The loss of 
emp10yment, as a consequence of the c10sing of state enterprises, food deprivation, heaIth 
problems and deaths offamily members due to famine, dispelled North Koreans from 
their 'workers' paradise'. 
As the living conditions in North Korea began to deteriorate and basic rations of 
food were no longer available, an increasing number of North Koreans began to go to 
China in search of food and basic supplies. This increase was particularly evident 
following the famine in 1995, when the DPRK distribution system ceased to exist, which 
left its citizens in a desperate state of starvation and caused its citizens to suffer from 
disease due to malnutrition. A study conducted by Johns Hopkins University reported that, 
at the peak of the famine in 1997, numbers reached 50 deaths per 100000 people, a death 
rate caused by starvation that is said to be eight times more than the average rate. Rough 
estimates offamine-related deaths from the mid to late 1990s are at 2-3.5 million 
(Seymour 2005, 7). 
Leaving North Korea 
Since the famine and floods in North Korea in the 1990s, access to public goods, 
such as food, shelter, education and employment have become extremely difficu lt for the 
average citizen. In addition to the lack of essential goods, the North Korean government 
has a system that categorises its citizens into three hierarchical categories, indicating their 
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status in the eyes of the DPRK government: "core", "wavering" and "hostile," which are 
further divided into 51 levels. Those in the "core" class consist of government officiaIs 
and those who are deemed to have a total devotion to the country and its regime. They are 
among the elite in North Korea and are given priviJeges such as food, housing and 
employment and consist of25% of the population (U.S. State Department, 2002). The 
"wavering" class includes people who have a history of suspicious behaviour and whose 
complete loyalty is under question, which may go as far back as three generations. They 
make up 55% of the population and often hold low-level positions served to support the 
DPRK regime. Those who are found to be in the "hostile" group are the last to receive 
goods distributed by the govemment and have limited to access to food and economic 
means of survival. People considered to be "hostile" are constantly monitored and 
discriminated against and are most susceptible to severe punishment and deprivation. 
North Koreans demoted to the "hostile" class are subject to a sentence in one of the 
labour camps in the remote areas of the country and have little hope for improving their 
fate_, _should they remain in North Korea. People in this group include relatives ofthose 
who fled to Japan or South Korea during the Korean War (Chang, Haggard & Noland 
2006, 16). 
The North Korean government urges the governments of neighbouring countries 
to retum any of its citizens found without proper documentation to support their departure 
from the DPRK. In Article 47 of North Korea's criminal code, it "stipulates that a citizen 
who commits acts against the country like defecting to a foreign country with a view to 
overthrowing the Republic is to be given penalties" (Amnesty International 1996, 14). It 
also states that "one who escapes to another country or to the enemy in betrayal of his 
motherland and people will receive a punishment of a minimum of seven years labour-re-
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education, and for serious violations the mandated sentence is execution and forfeiture of 
aIl pro pert y (Amnesty International 1996, 14). Serious offences inc1ude being caught 
meeting with foreigners and being caught in the possession of Bibles. 
The Border 
The most direct route to South Korea is crossing the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) 
that divides the Korean peninsula. 248 km long and 4km wide, it is guarded by a total of 2 
million military personnel from both sides of the border and is the most heavily armed 
border in the world. 
A second option for border crossing is to the East, where the DPRK bord ers 
Siberia, Russia's eastern maritime province, and is separated by 17km of the Tumen 
Delta. In addition to it being difficult to cross due to the delta's strong currents, its 
location in the far northeast region and its smaJI border, make it inaccessible for most. 
Many Koreans in the former USSR who seek refugee status are those who have go ne to 
work in the lumber yards in the former USSR and have decided to abandon their post, 
while sorne have crossed illegally. In 1998, there was an estimated 200-300 North Korean 
refugees in Russia. By 2004, it increased to about 2000 (International Crisis Group 2006, 
20). Those who reach the UJ\THCR office in Moscow are permitted to apply for refugee 
status. The reasons for fewer North Koreans in Russia are numerous: one is that the 
border is harder to reach; many don't know ifthey will have better protection by the 
government and the border is highly secured. Moreover, local officiaIs don't follow 
federallaws and are easily swayed by North Korean officiaIs. 
From the Russian government's point ofview, in order to maintain "good 
relations" with North Korea, the y must immediately return illegal North Koreans found 
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on Russian territory. Migrant workers must also be monitored with rigor and punished, 
should they try to "abandon" their working responsibilities. As a result, regular 
inspections of churches and other religious institutions, where escapees know that they 
can get help, are conducted. While sorne North Koreans try to make their way to South 
Korea, there are still many who wish to remain anonymous and live a life of exile in 
Russia or other former Soviet states for fear that, should they be identified, the families 
they left behind would be subject to further hardships inflicted by the DPRK regime, for 
the mere fact of being associated with a family member who has committed the grievous 
crime of having left the country without official permission. 
North Koreans in China 
The majority of North Koreans who leave home go to China. Of the 1416 km 
shared border with China, the route most travelled is by crossing the Tumen River. Until 
the early 1990s, the North Korea-China border had been rather porous. lt was common 
for people from both sides of the border to exchange and engage in commercial activities. 
In order to travellegally (either within the country or beyond its borders), aIl North 
Koreans were required to request a travel visa from the government. The government 
generally granted visas to those who went to China for trade or to visit relatives; however, 
since obtaining this document is quite time consuming and cumbersome, many simply 
went to China illegally. In the past, the North Korean government, aware ofthis activity, 
would permit it to a certain degree, as it was a source ofhard currency and necessary 
goods for North Korea. In the early 1990s, when the living conditions in the DPRK 
further deteriorated and larger numbers of North Koreans began to seek refuge abroad, 
the North Korean government enforced its policy on the illegal migration of its citizens. 11 
89 
tightened its borders and urged the Chinese government to help them enforce this law by 
repatriating any illegal North Koreans found in China. According to the North Korean 
Criminal Code, all migrants who leave the country without permission are criminals, thus 
committing acts of treason against the DPRK. Those found guilty of this crime are subject 
to a sentence in a labour camp and, in extreme cases, to death. 
Despite these risks, the majority of North Korean refugees interviewed by NGOs 
and Christian groups have said that crossing the border is relatively easy. In the winter, 
they walk across the frozen Yalu and Tumen Rivers and in the summer, they either swim 
or walk across the shallow part of the river. There are some who, after having studied the 
guards' schedule, wait until nightfall to cross. Others bribe the border guards or engage in 
the services of 'brokers' who control the trafficking of North Koreans at the border region. 
Over the years, reinforced security at the borders requires North Koreans going to China 
to have some type ofmonetary exchange. The average rate is 3 months' salary ofa North 
Korean (Seymour 2005, 9). 
While the motivations for leaving North Korea are mainly economic, there are 
still a small number who have political motivations for leaving. Human Rights Watch 
interviews reveal that "[a] young woman decided to go to China with her uncle in 1998 in 
order to aid her father, who had fallen into serious debt after having taken a loan to buy 
medicine for her dying mother. One young man and his family left in 1999 because he 
could not enter medical school or a teaching college because of family background" (Baik 
et al. 2002, 9). 
Those interviewed expressed their concem for the possible hardships they would 
face, should they get caught crossing into China, but decided to cross because they felt 
that they had no other choice for survival. "Many found it a terrifying, near-death 
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experience, and to aIl it represented a decisive moment of separation when the y crossed 
not only a national border, but the border between being a citizen and a criminal, or even 
a traitor". (Baik et al. 2002, 10). Those who crossed without assistance had a more 
difficult time. A young man whose family spent time in a North Korean prison camp 
describes his traumatic experience crossing into China alone: 
1 had seen almost four hundred North Koreans repatriated from China during my 
stay [in the labour camp] ... It was so dangerous to cross the border, but 1 decided 
to cross anyway ... ljust wagered my life and went forward without knowing 
where the hidden checkpoint lay. 1 came across a checkpoint on my way to the 
river, but two of the guards were asleep, snoring. 
Whenever 1 think of that moment, 1 sweat. ... [Because of my family background] 
the [North Korean] National Security Agency would regard me as a spy or a 
traitor and might kill me by gunshot or imprison me for life without any court 
procedure. 1 would be sent to an administrative labour camp or a secret mine, or 
perhaps my body would be used as an object for chemical experimentation. 
Anyhow, 1 would have wound up like a dead body, though 1 might be breathing" 
(Human Rights Watch interview with Mf. Lee H, Seoul, July 16,2001 in Baïk et 
al. 2002, 10). 
Who are the "smugglers"? 
The group assisting the saetomin in leaving North Korea and, through third 
countries, to the ROK, is comprised of a variety of people. With the onset of famine and 
the large number of North Koreans leaving the country in 1994, humanitarian aid groups 
and Christian missionaries and Buddhist groups were the main source of aid for the 
saetomin in China. Christian missionaries and advocacy groups sponsored by Koreans 
living in the United 'States, Japan and South Korea, who set up orphanages and safe 
houses in China, provided much assistance. Sorne of these organisations were involved in 
helping North Koreans reach South Korea. However, when the Chinese govemment 
began their crackdown on organisations involved in helping North Koreans escape to 
third countries and South Korea in the late 1990s, the numbers of such groups decreased; 
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instead, they changed their focus towards improving the living conditions of North 
Koreans in China and in the DPRK through ecoüomic development and aid. In the case of 
those in China, Christian groups also provided moral support. 
There are still a small number ofNGOs and religious groups involved in the 
"Underground Railroad"J. While the sensitive nature of the operation prevents disclosure 
of ail those involved, Reverend Tim Peters, an evangelical pastor based in Seoul, is 
known to be the open representative of the organised movement of North Koreans. This 
American missionary is the founder and director of Helping Hands Korea, which he 
established in 1996 to provide famine relief to North Korea, which then began operations 
for providing refugees assistance in China and for helping to coordinate their passage to 
third countries. Other organisations known to be involved in such operations are 
Durihana, a South Korean Christian group, and Citizens' Alliance for North Korean 
Ruman Rights, a non-partisan NGO that focuses on international advocacy and on 
improving living conditions in North Korea. In addition to these groups, Norbert 
Vollersten, a German medical doctor and outspoken advocate who was expelled 11'0111 
North Korea in 2000 for speaking out against the regime, has been involved in organised 
assistance of the saetomin (Won 2003,301). 
NGOs involved in the "Underground Railroad" often seek the assistance of 
"brokers" who are on 'friendly' terms with border guards and who have a network of 
people to assist them on the route. The brokers consist of North Koreans, ethnie Koreans 
in China and North Koreans who have already settled in South Korea. The latter are those 
who have already taken the route and have contacts in China and North Korea. They often 
become 'brokers' because they see it as a lucrative source of income and a better option 
1 Often referred to as the 'Seoul Train', it is similar to the Underground Railroad in North America that 
smuggled black slaves from the United States to Canada in the 19th C. 
compared to their struggling life in South Korea (International Crisis Group 2006, 14). 
However, many ofthem work on an ad hoc basis to help their friends and family 
members reach South Korea. The number of saelomin "brokers" has gradually 
diminished since the ROK govemment reduced the cash settlements given to North 
Korean asylum seekers by two thirds in 2004, as those smuggled generally pay with the 
settlement money that they receive. 
Passage to South Korea through Third Countries 
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Many North Koreans prefer to live a quiet life in China because they feel that it is 
the option with the least risk of deportation and trafficking. However, due to the 
increasing threat of their repatriation, a growing number have decided to seek refuge in 
third countries. While there are a number of North Koreans who do not wish to settle in 
South Korea and simply choose to stay in the other surrounding countries, the focus of 
this study, with respect to North Koreans travelling to these countries, is on those whose 
final destination is South Korea and who simply use these countries for passage. 
The costs of sending a saetomin from China to South Korea through Southeast 
Asia can vary from $2000-$3000 and $5000-$6000 (International Crisis Group 2006, 17). 
The North Koreans are told that they should repay this fee once they arrive in South 
Korea with the settlement money that they will receive from the South Korean 
govemment. Throughout their joumey, they are passed onto various guides at certain 
points. The journey is physically draining, and money is needed to bribe various officiaIs 
and to pay for the various forms of passage. 
Since the Chinese government began systematic repatriation of North Korean 
refugees in the mid 1 990s, it has been more difficult for the saetomin to seek asylum ai 
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the various consulates and embassies in China. Increased security and guards have been 
placed at these diplomatie offices, ready to apprehend any North Korean asylum seekers 
they find. Media footage has shown North Koreans being dragged from the boundaries of 
diplomatie missions by local Chinese authorities who detain them, then send them back to 
North Korea, where the y must meet their fate as traitors of the state. The increased 
watchful eye of Chinese authorities has prompted NGOs and relief workers to find 
alternatives for sending saetomin to South Korea. WhiJe the number ofNGOs 
specialising in moving people through the underground railroad has diminished, there are 
still quite a few that exist with the help ofbrokers - many ofwhom are North Koreans 
who also took the "Underground Railroad" to South Korea. 
In recent years, the "Northeast Asian Underground Railroad" (the Seoul Train) 
has increasingly used the route through Southeast Asia as a passage to South Korea. The 
Seoul Train is organised by a mix of Christian and humanitarian activists. Those caught 
helping are in just as much danger of being detained as those who are seeking such 
services. The operation requires money, meticulous planning and trustworthy people. The 
amount of money required or the route travelled depends on the circumstances at the time 
of the journey. 
As with other countries experiencing an increasing flow of North Korean refugees, 
while they are sympathetic to the refugees, these countries do not wish to attract too many 
saetomin. Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Thailand have diplomatie relations with 
both North and South Korea and do not wish to create offence to either country by the 
way in which they handle the presence of North Korean asylum seekers found within 
their borders. Of the countries mentioned, Vietnam, Laos and Burma are not welcoming 
of saetomin and have the policy to repatriate them whenever possible. 
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As an increasing number of North Koreans leave their home, the Chinese 
government and officiais from various Southeast Asian countries have become less 
sympathetic to their cause. GraduaIly, the presence of North Koreans in these countries is 
creating a stigma towards them. Their increasing numbers are no longer commiserated as 
in the past, and the locals are less open to offering aid and support. This phenomenon 
seems to be becoming a reality in South Korea, as weIl, and is examined in the following 
chapter. 
Chapter V - North Korean Asylum Seekers in South Korea 
The increasing number of North Korean asylum seekers is a cause for concern, not 
only for the Chinese authorities, but also for the South Korean government. Although the 
number of saetomin living in South Korea represents only a small fraction of the number 
in China and in third countries, it is the South Korean government that provides financial 
settlement and support to those living in the ROK. It is also the ROK government that 
absorbs most of the costs ofprocessing the saelomin 's requests for asylum and the costs 
of their transport from the third countries to South Korea. In addition to the financial costs 
involved in supporting the increasing numbers of saetomin ~n South Korea, there is 
concem for the effect that their presence and the ROK's acceptance ofthem w~ll have, not 
only on the diplomatic relations with North Korea, but also with the other countries 
affected by this issue (namely, China and Southeast Asian countries). 
Since the end of the Korean War, there has been a change in the nature of North 
Korean asylum seekers. Until 1990, an average of 5-10 North Korean asylum seekers 
arrived in the ROK each year, comprised ofmainly male members of the DPRK elite. 
Among the elite were diplomats who sought asylum while stationed abroad, pilots who 
flew their planes to the South, soldiers from special units with privileged information on 
the functioning of the DMZ cross over. These North Koreans were referred to as 
defectors, since their social status in North Korea gave them access to privileges avai1ab1e 
only to a select few. It has been determined that poiiticai motivation, rather than the 1ack 
of materiai goods, was the reason for seeking asylum. Over the years, as the 
characteristics and the circumstances of the North Korean arrivaIs have changed, so has 
the South Korean government's approach and policies towards addressing the saelomin 
issues. The ROK has shifted its policies from the repatriation approach to an integration 
approach, in which the latter aims to help the asylum seekers to become independent by 
creating programs to support their integration into South Korean society. 
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The purpose ofthis chapter is twofold: the first is the examination of the 
'evolution' of South Korea's policies on North Korean asylum seekers, inc1uding the 
support and settlement payments provided for them; the second is to identify the 
problems and causes of the saetomins' integration into South Korean society. As part of 
the discussion on the elements affecting integration, an analysis is made of whether these 
factors are common problems or whether they are specific to the North Korean asylum 
seekers in South Korea. 
The Nature of North Korean Asylum Seekers 
As of 2005, the South Korean Ministry ofUnification's official sources indicate 
that since the end of the Korean War, there has been an estimated 7688 North Korean 
asylum seekers in South Korea, of whom 245 have either died or moved to another 
country (mainly the United States) (Lankov 2006,53). More than half ofthese arrived in 
South Korea from 1994, when the number of arrivaIs in the double digits began. The 
number of Koreans who moved to the South was largest following the 1945 Liberation 
and during the Korean War. Foley' s study indicates that from 1945-1953, 19% of the 
North's population moved to the South for various reasons, totalling an estimated 900000 
migrants (Lankov 2006,54). Detailed information on the migration of North Koreans to 
South Korea is found in Table 1 and Table 2. 
Following this period, there were virtually no migrants crossing the DMZ. The 
sharp decrease in the number of migrants from the North to the South is explained by the 
strict border patrols in the DPRK, which prevented its citizens from leaving without 
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pennission. Along the 40 km stretch of the DMZ that separates the North from the South, 
electric fences and landmines fortify the area, in addition to the total 2 million soldiers 
who stand guard on either side of the border. The beaches in the DPRK, to which regular 
access is forbidden to North Koreans, are also riddled with electric fences and landmines 
to prevent unauthorised entry and departure. Another explanation is the North's 
economic strength relative to the South. In the 1960s, North Korea's estimated ONP per 
capita was $172 (USD), exceeding that of the ROK, which was $85 (USD) per capita at 
the time. (Hamm 1999 as in Lankov 2006, 54) '. Since the North was more developed and 
more prosperous, there was little reason to leave the comforts of North Korea during this 
period. As South Korea surpassed the North in economic strength and its standard of 
living rose to that of the developed Western countries, life in North Korea was gradually 
beginning to deteriorate, eventually causing the increasing number of its citizens to seek 
refuge outside their own country, thus changing the demographics of North Korean 
asylum seekers from being defectors of the DPRK privileged classes to members of the 
general population in search of the basic necessities oflife. 
The North Koreans who arrived from the mid-1990s were mainly victims of the 
famine in North Korea. The majority ofthem spent a significant amount oftime in third 
countries before their arrivaI in South Korea. It has only been in recent years, as their 
numbers kept increasing, that the ROK government has provided more information about 
the asylum seekers. Their growing presence has pressed the government to take a more 
active role in their settlement process. The earlier arrivaIs were used by the ROK 
1 Researcher Hamm Taik-Young believes that it was only in 1974 that the ROKs per capita GN P started to 
exceed the North's (Hamm 1999 as in Lankov 54). 
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government as valuable sources of information for its intelligence unit and as an asset to 
its strategie plan against North Korea. 
Table 1 - North Korean Asylum Seekers in South Korea 
Year 
1953-1970 
1970-1979 
1980-1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Total 
Number 
485 
59 
63 
9 
9 
8 
8 
52 
41 
56 
85 
71 
148 
312 
583 
1139 
1281 
1894 
1384 
7688 
Source: MOU 2005a 
Table 2: The Number of Migrants from the North to the South - 1945-1953 
Pre-W ar (1945 -1950) 456000 
1950-1953 400000-650000 
Source: Foley 2003 
The Screening Pro cess 
Most of the North Korean asylum seekers in South Korea have had to overcome 
numerous obstacles in reaching their final destination, beginning with the initial risk they 
took in leaving the DPRK and their constant fear ofbeing repatriated from the authorities 
in China and the third countries. The Republic of Korea's official policy towards North 
99 
Korean asylum seekers is "based on brotherly love toward fellow Koreans and universal 
humanitarianism, [ ... ] to accommodate ail those North Korean refugees who wish to 
come to the South" (Charney 2005, 16). However, the ROK prefers to provide direct 
assistance to North Korea, in hopes of addressing the causes of the massive outflow of its 
citizens by improving the living conditions in the DPRK. Encouraging North Korean 
migration to the South is seen as a potential risk for destabilising the North, which in turn 
could result in its collapse, thus putting the responsibility of the ROK to support North 
Korea. Another cause for concern is the negative impact it would have on South Korea's 
relationship with North Korea. 
Despite the ROK's preference in limiting the arrivaI of asylum seekers, North 
Koreans are considered South Korean citizens as is outlined in Article 3 of the ROK 
constitution. In addition, they are given the right to travel to the South under the 
Republic's 'Protection of North Korean Residents and Support of Their Settlement Act,' 
Law number 6474, Article 7, which stipulates: 
1. Any person who has defected from North Korea and desires to be protected under 
this Act shall apply for protection to the head of an overseas diplomatic or 
consular mission ... 
2. The head of lm overseas diplomatic or consular mission ... who receives such an 
application for protection ... shall without delay inform the fact to the Minister of 
National Unification and the Director Agency for National Security Planning ... 
3. The Director of Agency for National Security Planning notified pursuant to the 
provision of Paragraph 2 shall take provisional protective measures or other 
necessary steps and shall without delay infQrm the Minister of National 
Unification of the result. (Seymour 2005,25) 
However, with each law, there are exceptions; such is expressed in a statement given by 
the South's Unification Minister, Lim Tong-Won, in 1999, who declared: 
... the [South Korean] government is ready to accept ail North 
Korean refugees, ifthey want to emigrate to the South ... .it is the 
basic principle of the Seoul govemment to welcome ail North 
Korean refugees, [ ... ] it is in line with the Constitution to 
accommodate North Korean refugees (Baïk 2002,57). 
Only a lucky few are fortunate enough to have their claims for asylum accepted by the 
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South Korean diplomatic missions abroad, let alone pass the multiple screening process, 
ofwhich the most basic is not to fall into the category ofthose ineligible for asylum; i.e.: 
serious criminals, those suspected ofpretending to defect, those who have lived in a third 
country for ten or more years, and those recognised by presidential decree to be unfit for 
protection. The screening process, which is conducted under the administration of the 
ROK Ministry of Unification and its Intelligence Agency, begins only once an application 
for asylum has been processed and accepted. These are examined by the ROK diplomatic 
missions with the UNHCR. This three month process, conducted in the country where the 
request for asylum is made, may be fast-tracked to as little as two weeks for the ailing, 
children, or those deemed to have valuable intelligence information, which include high 
ranking officiaIs and POWs (International Crisis Report 2006,26). In reality, the North 
Koreans who have been granted asylum wait an average of 1-2 years before they can 
enter South Korea, during which time, they must wait in hiding in the safe houses 
provided by the people who helped them escape. Their status as illegal migrants in the 
countries where they have applied for asylum limits their mobility and places them in 
danger of being deported or detained if caught by local authorities. 
Despite the fact that the South Korean government has the general policy of 
accepting North Koreans who seek asylum, the reality is that only a small fraction are 
accepted, and many are turned away without even having been given the chance to place 
a c1aim, nor are they provided with any guidance as to what alternative choices they have. 
In 1997, the Kim Young Sam government sent out communications to its overseas 
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missions, stating that the South's basic policy is to accept aIl North Korean asylum 
seekers who wish to settle in the ROK; it was further explained that aIl final decisions 
regarding this issue are at the discretion of the diplomatic missions in considering the 
effect that it will have on the relationship with the ho st country. That is, "[i]f cooperation 
between the embassy and the host country is smooth, then it is easy. If the country 
severely opposes our facilitating resettlement in South Korea, the embassy won't accept 
them. If the country protests severely, we won't accept them" (Ministry of Unification as 
in Human Rights Watch 2002,31). Under this policy, requests made in China are usually 
not accepted and no assistance is offered to North Korean asylum seekers by the South 
Korean government. 
Upon their arrivaI at the airport in Seoul, the saetomin who are granted asylum are 
escorted by members of the South Korean Intelligence Agency directly to a facility run by 
the National Intelligence Command for further investigation. Prior to 1998, they 
underwent a month long period of 'questioning' and five months of 'education' on living 
in a democratic society. The month long period of 'questioning' was carried out by the 
'North Korean Refugee Council', ajoint council comprised ofmembers from five 
different South Korean agencies (Ministry of Unification, National Defence, Health and 
Social Welfare, Labour and Education), whose purpose was to identify the real North 
Korean refugees. They filtered out any possible North Korean spies andjoseonjoe posing 
as North Koreans who hoped to benefit from the South's settlement payments given to 
saetomin3, or anyone who may pose a threat to South Korea. This period of investigation 
was one of the final steps before North Koreans were permitted to interact with the 
2 Joseonjok are ethnie Koreans from China. 
3 Sinee the Joseonjok have Chinese eitizenship, they are eonsidered by the ROK govemment as foreigners 
and ean legally enter the South, as sueh, and are not eligible for any 'privileges' that may be offered to 
ethnie Koreans living abroad (Korean diaspora). 
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general South Korean population. Today, these procedures are conducted during the 
saetomin 's stay at Hanawon. 
The South Korean Settlement Policy 
The saetomin who arrived in the ROK before the collapse of the block were 
we1comed as national heroes in their opposition 10 the Kim Il Sung regime. They were 
guaranteed life-Iong stipends and a reasonable income, which were enough for them to 
live comfortably. In addition, they were given ownership of an apartment unit, given the 
right to study at their university of choice without having to undergo the regular 
application process4 and provided with personal bodyguards to help with daily living for a 
short period, as well as to protect them from any possible threats from locals. Their 
numbers of arrivaI were small enough for the South Korean government to support them 
without difficulty, despite the fact that the stipends provided during this period were 
much more than any regular South Korean citizen could ever imagine receiving; they 
were used as a propaganda tool in a campaign to encourage northern defections.5 ln 
addition to the basic settlement, 'National Merit Rewards' were given to those who 
provided information which was considered valuable to South Korean national 
intelligence. ln 1983, Yi Ung-pyong, a pilot who defected using a Ml G-19 fighter jet, 
received an award equivalent to $300 000 USD and was given the choice of payment in 
cash or gold bars (Grinker 1988, 233) and in 1997, Hwang Chang-y op, the architect of the 
Juche ideology and the highest level DPRK defector, received 250 million won (about 
4 The process for South Koreans to enter into university is highly competitive. They must take entrance 
exams for which they may prepare for as early as primary school by studying at 'crams schools' in addition 
to their regular schooling. 
5 Before the large flow of refugees in South Korea, defectors were an invaluable source of intelligence 
information on North Korea. 
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$250 000 USD - the largest sum permitted under the law in 1997) (Lankov 2006, 61). 
FoIlowing the faIl of the Soviet Union in 1989 and at the end of the International Cold 
War, communism was no longer an imminent threat to the ROK, thus giving them a 
reason to stop their propaganda campaign. It was also around this time that an increasing 
flow of defectors began to emerge. In its efforts to accommodate the increasing numbers 
of North Korean asylum seekers, the South Korean government revised its policy for 
settlement support. The govemment has, since then, revised its policy several times, with 
the most significant change being in 1993, when priority was given to the "settlement 
model", which encourages the saetomin to become independent and self-sufficient South 
Korean citizens; that is to say, the new settlement's policy is to facilitate the successful 
integration of North Korean asylum seekers. In its efforts towards this goal, in 2004, the 
Ministry of Unification created a new legal term to refer to North Korean asylum seekers: 
saetomin is to replace the term talbuJqa ("refugees"), which, following a public survey, 
was concluded that the North Koreans in South Korea did not like to be referred to as 
such, since they felt that it had negative connotations6. 
The principle adjustment, however, was the reduction ofmonetary assistance 
provided. In lieu of giving one lump sum payment of aIl the settlement money to which 
the y are entitled, the latest policy is to pay their settlement in three instalments and their 
housing stipend over a period oftwo years. Reports suggest that in addition to easing the 
goVernment' s financial burden of providing settlement payments for the hundreds of 
saetomin that have arrived in recent years, it is also used as a tactic to prevent the asylum 
seekers, who are not used to handling money, from spending aIl oftheir settlement money 
at once and more importantly, to limit the number of asylum seekers who hire brokers to 
6 By being referred to as a refugee, the North Koreans feel that it creates an image that they are 
dishonourable people to have abandoned their homes and their families. 
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enter into South Korea, by controlling the saetomin 's immediate access to hard currency. 
Many asylum seekers spend much of their settlement money repaying brokers who helped 
them on their quest to enter South Korea in addition to using it to help friends and family 
members to join them (with the use ofbrokers). The settlement provided until 2004, 
which consisted of payments of $32 000 in 3 instalments and $6500 for each member of 
the household (Charney 2005,17), has since been c.hanged to $10 000 cash upfront and 
$25 000 worth of payment for housing, education, training, job placement and payments 
made over a two-year period. However, these payments are an average of what may be 
given. The ROK has categorised its payments into basic, supplementary and incentive 
settlements for the new arrivaIs. The basic assistance is about 100 times the minimum 
wage (~$568 USD) and is ca1culated based on the number offamily members living 
together. Supplementary assistance is provided up to 100 times the minimum wage for the 
elderly and the handicapped; incentives are provided as encouragement for the asylum 
seekers to become independent (MOU 2005a). In addition to monetary assistance, the 
South Korean pro gram introduced ajob training and job subsidy pro gram under the 
Ministry of Labour in 2001 (refer to tables 3, 4, and 5). The saetomin do not have to pay 
basic medical fees, nor do they have to pay any tuition fees. As public universities are 
free in Korea, the government incurs aIl the expenses for these. For those who wish to 
attend private universities, the government provides assistance for halfthe costs, while 
the individual schools provide support for the remaining fees. 
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Table 3 - Criteria for Basic Assistance (in USD) 
No. of Family Initial Assistance in Housing Total 
Members Assistance instalments Assistance 
over 2 years 
--~~_.~.-
1 $3000 $7000 $10000 $20000 
2 $4000 $10 000 $15000 $29000 
3 $5000 $13 000 $15000 $33000 
4 $6000 $16000 $15000 $37000 
5 $7000 $19000 $15000 $41 000 
6 $7000 $22000 $15000 $44000 
7 and more $7000 $25000 $15 000 $47000 
Source: MOU 2005b 
ln addition to the initial settlement payments, asylum seekers who are unable to be self-
sufficient or cannot work due to a particular ailment are provided with additional 
assistance according to the criteria described in Table 4. 
Table 4 - Criteria for Supplementary Assistance 
Classification Criteria for Assistance Amount of Assistance 
~ ________ ::--~.,------_---:---c ______ (-=-=U=S-::-D:"--) __ .. _____ .. _ ..._ .. __ ........ _ ... _._. __ ..... _._ ... __ .. 
Age Over 60 years old $7200 
Physically Handicapped Level of handicap $3600-$15 400 
Long-term Medical Care Hospital stays of over 3 months $800/month 
Child support for 
children under 12 
Source: MOU 2005b 
due to serious illness 
Children living with one parent, 
or with no parents living with 
grandparent( s) 
$3600 
As an incentive to encourage asylum seekers to successfully complete job training 
programs and to gain employment, the South Korean government provides additional 
funds. It especially encourages the saetomin to pursue vocational training in sectors 
where there is a shortage of employees. Included in the list of 447 job categories for 
which training courses are provided by the Ministry of Unification are: machinery, metal 
works, chemical engineering, ceramic engineering, electronics, telecommunications, 
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environmental sciences, crafts, safety control, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
transportation and education (Choi 2004, 107). 
Before the North Korean asylum seekers are given their settlement payments, the 
saetomin must successfully complete their "training" at the "Center for Supporting the 
Adaptation of North Korean Defectors" (more commonly known as Hanawon), where 
they must remain for a total of four months, during which time they are isolated from 
society. Hanawon is a re-education facility located in the rural farming region of Anseong, 
about 75 km outside of Seoul, and is run by the Ministry of Unification, with the 
collaboration of other Ministries and agencies. It is a national security facility where only 
North Korean asylum seekers are sent upon their arrivaI in South Korea. Since it opened 
in August 1998, there have been over 5000 'graduates'at Hanawon. It was opened to 
accommodate the re-education of the increasing numbers of North Korean asylum seekers 
about capitalism and South Korean society - a role that was previously under the 
authority of the South Korean intelligence agency.7 It also serves as a place to provide 
medical and moral support to facilitate the transition to life in South Korea. 
While the MOU states that the facility provides protection and education for 2400 
each year, it can only house 400 people at a time (MOU 2005, 107). The minimum length 
of stay required has been reduced from one year to three months, which has been 
criticised by sorne who feel that the length of time spent at Hanawon is too short for 
adequate preparation.8 The daily schedule, from 9am-5pm, is divided as follows: 246 
ho urs of classes of which 48% are in cultural differences; 30% in employment training 
and 14% in psychological aid (Choi 2004, 96). Classes are administered on capitalism, 
7 The South Korean intelligence agency's main role is to fiIterout spies and to ensure that the saelomÎn 
reject communism and the North Korean regime, which is continued at Hanawon (although not mentioned 
as part oftheir official curriculum). 
8 Those 60 years and older are not required to stay at Hanawon. 
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computer literacy, Korean, English and Chine se languages and Korean pronunciation,9 
while the sessions on cultural differences inc1ude contemporary South Korean history, 
traditional customs and rituals still followed. Other instruction inc1udes field trips to 
cultural centers, lessons on daily living, such as riding the subway, driving, opening a 
bank account, cooking, purchasing goods at the market, using cell phones and for those 
who are interested, religious activity at either of Hanawon's Protestant or Buddhist 
centers, of which many continue to follow after their stay, because the y enjoy the support 
and companionship it provides. Daily group therapy sessions are also a part of the 
program; the saetomin are encouraged to express any hardships or concerns they may 
have. However, medical treatment is the most important service that is offered, as many 
have lived in third countries for an average ofthree years before their arrivaI in South 
Korea and have und erg one much physical strain in addition to the malnutrition and other 
health problems they may have suffered in North Korea. Therefore, most are in need of 
urgent medical treatment. 
Specialised training in baking, health care and beauty are provided for women, 
and programs for children are also available to help them integrate into the regular South 
Korean schools. Under the Roh Mun Hyun govemment, further efforts have been made 
to facilitate the integration of North Korean asylum seekers, as their success (or failure) is 
interpreted as a foresight to what to expect, should unification occur. Job fairs are 
organised in collaboration with employment agencies and the local YMCA introduces the 
9South Korea has adopted many foreign words in its vocabulary, especially from the English language. In 
order to be marketable for ajob, one must also have basic English language skills. One must also have a 
basic knowledge of sino-Korean words and be able to write and recognise its Chinese characters. (ln its 
efforts to 'purify' the Korean language, the DPRK has eliminated the use of foreign words, with the 
exception of sorne sino-Korean vocabulary that was considered necessary and made up new terms as a 
supplement.) North Koreans have a distinctive pronunciation when they speak Korean (dialect), which can 
be identified quite easily. As South Korean society can be quite harsh in discriminating against those who 
do not speak in the 'standard' Korean accent, learning the proper pronunciation is an important element in 
their integration process. 
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saetomin to South Koreans. They are also given the opportunity to experience lite in a 
South Korean home after they have completed their training, upon which they receive the 
first instalment oftheir settlement money and the harsh reality oflife outside Hanawon 
sets in. Their housing is assigned by the government, and the y are provided with a police 
escort for 6 months (this has been reduced from the previous 12-24 months). These 
escorts serve a multi-purpose: to ensure that northern agents don't contact them; to 
provide support in daily routines; to protect them, should they be subject to a hate crime, 
and to ensure that they don't get into trouble (Choi 2004, 98). It is possible those high 
level defectors are provided with a longer period of "protection" and that more agents are 
assigned to them. 
Support available outside Hanawon is limited. The Council ofNGOs for Support 
for North Korean Defectors, composed of 49 religious and civic organisations, provide 
only minimal support due to their lack of funds (Choi 2004, 98). Other sources of support 
are: the Hangyeore School, which provides tutoring to help youth to adjust to school life; 
Sky Dream School and Dari Community, which help children without parents; Good 
People University, founded by the Yoido Full Gospel Church, which offers training in 
employment skills and helps in starting a business; and the Korean Bar Association, 
which gives free legal advice. 
According to an instructor at Hanawon, the saetomin are provided with the tools 
in choosing the professions they would like to enter into: "[ w]e neither recommend an 
occupation nor press them to select one, but we teach them to con si der different aspects 
of different careers" (Limb 2005). Their expectations are lowered after the training 
period: "[W]e are told that life outside Hanawon is going to be harsh" (Ms. Kim, defector 
as in Limb 2005). There have been criticisms that the stay at Hanawon is too short and 
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incomplete. Part of this problem resides in the difficulty for the saetomin to concentrate 
during the lectures because ofphysical fatigue from their journey, and many do not 
understand them, while others still have sentiments of mistrust of South Koreans. In order 
to rectify the latter problem, graduates of Hanawon have been asked to give lectures 
about their experiences living in South Korea. 
The South Korean government's settlement package offered to North Korean 
asylum seekers is more than what any refugee or new immigrant could expect from their 
host country. Not only do they receive cash payments, but reduced medical fees, less 
demanding application requirements for university entrance and even incentives for 
employment. The changes in policy and the support offered are a reflection of the Seoul 
government' s change in their desired perception of their course of action wi th regards to 
North Koreans. The perception of saetomin has evolved from being regarded as "national 
heroes" to a "socially handicapped" minority group requiring long-term special care, to a 
group of individuals with the capacity to become inde pendent and successful citizens of 
South Korea (MOU 2005b). 
Criticism of the saetomin settlement policy seems to come from two main groups: 
the South Korean taxpayers who are the source of funding for these packages and the 
North Korean asylum seekers themselves. The general impression of North Korean 
asylum seekers among South Koreans is that they are given too much money and that 
they live a life ofluxury. This image may have been true during the days when the 
conservative South Korean government used the new arrivaIs as tools for propaganda by 
declaring them as national heroes and providing them with enough money to take care of 
them for the rest of their life. That was also a period when there was no structured 
pro gram for the North Koreans, since their numbers were so few. Since the 1990s, the 
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govemment has restructured its program and vastly reduced the amount of money 
provided, which the South Korean public was not made aware of. Thus, many still 
assumed that the settlement payments were in the amount of a small fortune, which was 
true for the less wealthy South Koreans, who received less in govemment aid for the poor 
than the North Koreans received in settlement payments. The latest amendment, made to 
the 'Settlement Support for North Korean Defectors' in 2004, adjusted the amount of 
money provided to $32 000 (USD) so that the asylum seekers receive the same amount of 
money as the South Korean poor. Despite the reduction in payments, the financial 
incentives for North Korean defectors are still more than what is available to regular 
South Korean citizens (MOU 2005b). 
On the other hand, the saetomin feel that the settlement payments they receive are 
inadequate. A number ofthem who have heard rumours that they would be provided with 
riches by the ROK govemment, arrive in South Korea with the expectation of living a life 
of immediate success and luxury. This impression would, undoubtedly, be influenced by 
the high-profile media attention and their rewards in the past. Another aspect that the 
North Koreans have difficulty dealing with is the difference in payments that asylum 
seekers receive that is usually based on providing invaluable intelligence information 10 
the ROK government. Having lived in a society where the North Korean govemment 
ingrained into the minds of its citizens that they are an equal and would be awarded as 
such, the saelomin expect the South Korean government to practise this concept of 
equality through the settlement payments provided. 
Lack offinancial support is not the cause of asylum seekers' economic difficulty, 
seeing as they still receive more money than the poorest South Koreans. It is their lack of 
experience and knowledge in living in a capitalist society and in understanding the 
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concept and use of currency, which is what they are taught at Hanawon. Despite the 
improvements made in the efforts to help integrate North Korean asylum seekers, 
criticism ofthe facility has been expressed by its 'students' and various NGOs that feel 
that the training received is inadequate. In a period ofthree months, it is difficult to learn 
aIl that is required to live a successfullife in South Korea, which, in fact, takes many a 
lifetime to figure out. One of the common complaints by the saetomin is that most of the 
hours of 'training' are spent on theoretical concepts about democracy, capitalism and 
South Korean society, rather than on more practical elements such as methods of 
successfully gaining employment and on job training. To sorne, it seems more like a 
South Korean 're-education' program, while many others feel that it is a good 
introduction to what is to come (Choi 2000). 
The program at Hanawon is still in its developmental stages. It has inc1uded 
many practical lessons on basic living in South Korea. From the time that they enter 
South Korea, to the moment the y are 'released' into society, the asylum seekers will have 
spent four months in isolation from the general public. This isolation from society makes 
it more difficult for them to get accustomed to their new life. While police escorts are 
provided for support in their integration process, many officers are assigned up to twenty 
or more North Koreans to guide, in addition to their regular duties. These escorts are 
entrusted to help with job placement, as weil as to teach the saetomin about daily living. 
The police, who are overworked and underpaid, do not always fulfill their duties to the 
fullest. If one is fortunate enough to be placed with a kind-hearted officer, the asylum 
seeker will be able to find a job and will be provided with good moral support. Those who 
encounter a dishonest worker may be swindled out of their settlement money and left with 
nothing (Choi 2000). 
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It has been recommended that the South Korean government work closer with 
N GOs on developing support and training programs for the successful integration of new 
arrivaIs. Although there are training cent ers and tutorial schools for North Koreans, as 
weIl as volunteer "Settlement Helpers", the resources and manpower are insufficient to 
meet the demands. While the South Korean govemment has been restructuring its support 
for North Korean refugees to accommodate their changing needs, there has been a need to 
increase their collaboration with NGOs and religious groups to focus on saetomin support 
and integration (Chang 2004). 
Challenges of Integration 
One of the main problems in integration into South Korean society is that many 
have unrealistic expectations of the govemment, based on past rumours from defectors in 
the South, who were provided with more money and benefits and treated as national 
heroes. The saetomin expected immediate acceptance from South Koreans, while the 
South Koreans assumed immediate adaptation from the North Koreans. The issue of 
saetomin integration into South Korean society is discussed in detail in the following 
section. 
1 A Question of Identity 
1 
Is the difficulty of integration attributed to the presence of a separate North and 
South Korean national identity? This question is what the present section seeks to address. 
While the issue is examined in three phases; at the South Korean governmental level, 
from the South Korean viewpoint and at the North Koreans' perception oftheir life in the 
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South, emphasis is placed on the last element, since the first two were already addressed 
in the previous sections ofthis chapter. 
As mentioned earlier, the South Korean government's settlement policy for North 
Koreans has been continuously modified in order to adjust to the changing needs of the 
saetomin. First, it was the accommodation ofthe increasing number of arrivaIs. More 
recently, efforts have been made to create programs to meet the specifie needs ofasylum 
seekers, as the demographics have diversified to consist mostly of a majority of women 
and children since the mid-1990s. In accordance to the ROK constitution, the financial 
and social assistance provided are the southern government's tokens of 'accepting' the 
Northerners as one of their own (South Korean citizens). While the Defector Settlement, 
which is offered exc1usively to North Koreans, is provided as a means to facilitate the 
integration process, this is only a limited time offer; eventually, the saetomin are expected 
to live independently in mainstream South Korean society. The settlement can be 
interpreted as a parent or guardian's initial support given to those in their care until the 
time cornes for them to venture out on their OWll. It is similar to the image of the stronger 
one helping its weaker counterpart, as mentioned in Chapter 3. The goal is to achieve 
happily employed, autonomous saetomin. According to the 
South Korean government, the asylum seekers are members of one Korean nation in a 
capitalist society. 
From a saetomin's perspective, life in South Korea is nothing like the Korea that 
they expected. Many North Koreans, having the idea that the people living on the 
Korean peninsula are of one Korean nation, are quite shocked at the vast differences 
between South Koreans and themselves. Joo Sung II, a former North Korean soldier 
stationed at the DMZ, who had more knowledge of South Korean society than most 
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asylum seekers, was still surprised when he arrived in the South. He stated, "1 thought of 
South Korea as being part of the same country as the North, and the people being of the 
same nationality .... [T]here were differences between what 1 thought and what was 
reality" (Shin, June 2006). lt is not uncommon for many saetomin to feel overwhelmed in 
the South, especially in a fast-paced capitalist society. Years of North Korean 
indoctrination, as with Cho Yeon Ji, still remain as an integral part ofone's behaviour, 
hindering one's integration process: 
Ilived like a virtual robot in North Korea, believing whatever 
the government told me, and that's why it's so difficult for me 
to adapt to my new life here. 1 can go anywhere, do anything 1 
want in South Korea, but most of the time 1 don't have the 
creativity to take advantage of this opportunity (Sims 2000). 
Many others, like Kim Eun Chol, feel as though they have arrived in a twilight zone: "1 
am living in a country where the people look like me and speak the same language, but 
their lifestyle and mentality are so vastly different that 1 feel like an alien" (Sims 2000). 
A common preoccupation of saetomin is their tendency to blend into mainstream 
society, without being identified as North Korean. The women tend to hi de behind layers 
of makeup, which they are not accustomed to do, as it is common for South Korean 
women to maximise the use of cosmetics. North Korean men, who can often be identified 
as such due to their smaller stature, colour their hair, as it is common in South Korea 
(Chang 2004,21). The most challenging element for the asylum seekers to overcome is 
the issue of language. They try to hide their North Korean accent, which sounds like a 
distinctive Korean dialect, and they take precautions to avoid using North Korean words 
and expressions. As a result, their own identities are in question, since they are compelled 
to modify their natural behaviour into one that is seen as Foreign and confusing. 
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Although a saetomin's sense of self in relation to South Korean society is most 
often influenced by their efforts to integrate, those who appear to be successful in the 
South also face difficulties. While there are instances when asserting one self as having 
come from North Korea may be to one's advantage, such as a restaurant owner in Seoul 
who specialises in North Korean cuisine, or director Jung Sung-San, who, after having 
been rejected from South Korean society, was made famous for his musical, "Yoduk 
Story," set in a North Korean prison. While Jung experienced consistent discrimination 
and rejection to the fact that he is from North Korea, he was able to overcome the 
obstacles. 
It is not uncommon for a successful saetomin who wishes to marry a South 
Korean woman to be rejected by the girl's parents because he is from North Korea. lt 
seems as though there is still a sense of the North Korean 'Other' among the South 
Korean population. While sorne of the reactions of South Koreans may not be intentional, 
it is clear that the anti-North Korean and anti- education they received as school children 
still remains with them. Kim Hyeong-Deok states, "My disappointment was great. First of 
aIl, it was difficult to accept an environment in which a person is judged only by his 
money" (Lankov 2006, 120). 
In the end, as with the North Koreans hiding in China, once the situation pt:rmits 
and life improves in the DPRK, they aIl wish to return to their hometowns in the North. 
Paterniti observes, " ... [T]hey were clearly torn, still loyal, even unconsciously patriotic, 
to the country they had fled - at the very least, forever shaped by it" (Paterniti 2003, 3). 
This plan to return 'home' indicates that the y feel that they will never really fully 
integrate into South Korean society, although, as observed by Pastor Chun Ki Won, who 
works with North Korean asylum seekers in South Korea, " ... but with time, defectorsjust 
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start 100king more South Korean. They start to look like they belong here, not like they're 
out of place" (Chang 2004, 20). 
South Korea has assumed the role of the 'protector' of the North - its older sibling 
who provides support in a time of need. It began with the humanitarian food aid during 
the severe drought and flood in the early 1990s and has continued by providing economic 
support with the establishment of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the financing of 
other joint activities. However, there are still remnants of the hard-lined anti- education 
that school children received, as late as the 1990s, and of the anti-North Korean sentiment 
that accompanied it. 
The media has changed its reporting on North Korean related issues. A shift has 
been led away from the politics, which always seems to bring out the darkened image or 
North Korea, to focus rather on the more positive events (which, since the 2000 summit, 
inc1uded agreements not to report negative news about each other). The human side ofthe 
North Koreans who live in the South is more accessible as the numbers are increasing and 
more studies are being conducted on how they are faring in the South; attempts are being 
made to dispel the myths of North Korean asylum seekers as people who live a life of 
luxury, an example of govemment propaganda which was created by the ROK in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
In a report given by the South Korean Ministry of Unification, it was found that as 
of September 2004, 70% of North Korean defectors were receiving social assistance for 
the poor from the government (Na 2004b), suggesting that they are having problems 
successfully integrating into South Korean society. The problems of Integration may be 
divided into three categories: social, economic and psychological. 
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Countless interviews have been conducted with North Korean asylum seekers by 
the South Korean government and researchers for the purpose of gathering information 
about the political and sociallife of North Koreans. It was only recently that the issues of 
adaptation began to be closely examined, for it is the common beliefthat the manner in 
which North Koreans adjust to life in South Korea is a reflection of the social concerns 
which may arise should North and South Korea become unified. 
Social Problems 
One of the most difficult aspects oflife in South Korea for North Korean asylu111 
seekers is living in solitude. The majority of North Koreans were uncomfortable in social 
situations, and it generally took about two years to overcome this social phobia. The main 
reason for their difficulty in adjusting to the South Korean lifestyle cornes from the large 
gap between life in South Korea and the life that the North Koreans were accustomed to 
in North Korea. They found South Korea to be very individualistic and capitalistic. These 
elements, which have become an integral characteristic of contemporary Korean society, 
can make anyone feel isolated in a busy cosmopolitan lifestyle of Seoul. This is 
particularly true for North Koreans. They find it difficult to relate to the South Koreans 
who seem to be more interested in the economy and material goods than anything cIse. 
Another barrier is the difficulty in associating with other North Koreans. While 
asylum seekers may be in close contact with other North Koreans in South Korea with 
whom they were acquainted prior to their arrivaI, in general, no real relationship is made 
between North Korean asylum seekers. One reason for this is that North Koreans tend to 
compare themselves with others in the same situation as they. If it is found that the other 
possesses more of something or is living better, a sense of animosity begins to develop 
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and a form of competition begins. When it is learned that economic success is gained by 
capital means, sorne harshly criticise their fellow asylum seekers. 'fhere also lies the fear 
that a close relationship with another North Korean of whom they know little about may 
result in a series ofunfortunate circumstances. The fear is that one of the North Koreans 
encountered may be a spy sent by the North Korean government. 
In order to help in their adaptation process, the South Korean government has 
developed a foster family service where North Koreans have the option of living with 
South Korean families who volunteer to host them. This is to provide social support for 
the North Koreans and is a way to provide guidance in learning how South Koreans live. 
Most opt to live alone in apartment complexes provided by the government. They do not 
like the idea of living with strangers and still possess a sense of mistrust. They pre fer to 
live a quiet life where no one risks impeding on their privacy (Woo 2000,368). 
Economic Factors 
Many North Koreans have little or no concept ofmoney. 'l'hey have come to the 
understanding that money is necessary in order to live in South Korea. Although they 
have been taught at Hanawon, the South Korean training facility for North Koreans, how 
to use currency, many still have trouble with its use. They are often overwhelmed with 
the variety of products available for purchase and have difficulty in figuring out the prices. 
There have also been several reported cases where only five days after having received 
their monthly salary, all has been spent. In North Korea, where goods were obtained 
through government-issued food rations or by barter trade, currency was not needed. 
According to a defector: "[t]he units ofmoney here are too large. 1 cannot comprehend 
how much money there is, and 1 don't need money. When 1 have had a lot ofmoney, l'Il 
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just because 1 don't understand how to use it" (Grinker 1998,243). 
Besides adjusting to the use of money, North Koreans must also change their 
attitude towards it and realize that it is a necessity for their livelihood. They were taught 
in North Korea that money is the root of capitalist slavery and that it represents evil and 
selfishness. One defector states: "1 do not want to be a slave to money. But at the same 
time, 1 desperately need money to live in this society" (Woo 2000, 3). Another change is 
the freedom of choice that the saetomin have. In South Korea, where there is an 
abundance of goods and food to purchase, making simple decisions may be 
overwhelming, especially for one whose whole life had been regimented. 
The South Korean government provides job placement services for North Koreans. 
Those who are employed often have difficulty keeping their jobs. Many of the jobs in 
North Korea do not exist in South Korea; therefore, new skills have to be learned to adapt 
to the South Korean work force. Those who are hired often work in unfamiliar 
environments with insufficient training to successfully accomplish their tasks. Those who 
work in clerical jobs often lack the necessary language skills to communicate effectively. 
Over the years, South Koreans have adopted sorne English terms into their vocabulary as 
weIl as kept sorne of the words ofChinese origin; whereas in North Korea, Kim II Sung 
"purified" the Korean language by eliminating most foreign vocabulary and created 
Korean substitutions for sorne terms. As a result, in addition to familiarizing themselves 
with their work environment, North Koreans must learn the local language. 
Asylum seekers have trouble adjusting to the competitive nature of the South 
Korean work force and are often looked down upon by their South Korean colleagues for 
not working with enough efficiency. In the South Korean working custom, colleagues 
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often socialize after work as a form ofbonding experience. Many of the North Koreans 
have said that they felt uncomfortable in these sitwHions. 
Psychological Factors 
The long and dangerous journey to South Korea has had many psychological 
effects on North Koreans. According to a study published in the April 2005 issue of the 
Journal of Traumatic Stress, a significant number of North Koreans living in South Korea 
suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome (PTSD). It has been found that a higher 
percentage of North Korean women suffer from PTSD than men. Since most of the 
asylum seekers spend time in a third country prior to their arrivaI in South Korea, l11any 
of the WOl11en have been subject to sexual abuse or human trafficking (lnternational Cri sis 
Group 2006, l3). Because of the des ire to forget about their traul11atic experiences, l11any 
do not seek treatl11ent for their psychological aill11ents. The result is the presence of 
anxiety, depression, alcoholisl11, nightl11ares and attel11pted suicides. Al110ng the 456 
saetomin surveyed in 1998 by the National Intelligence Service, 96% said that they feared 
being attacked by a South Korean and 65% stated that they have been threatened by a 
South Korean they knew (Baek and Koh 2002, 218). While treatl11ent is provided at 
Hanawon through cOl11pulsory therapy session~, many who require further treatment do 
not seek it once they are on their own; either because they are unaware of the ailment that 
the y have or they are suspicious of the psychiatrist's true intentions for treatment. 
One other problem that many North Koreans suffer from is guilt. They feel the 
constant guilt ofhaving left their loved ones behind in North Korea, whose family 
members are most likely puni shed by the DPRK government for being related to someone 
who has left the country without authorization. In North Korea, it is common prac.tice to 
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punish the family members ofthose who have committed a criminal act by reason of 
association, or if the individual in question cannot be found. As a result of this fear, many 
North Koreans prefer to live in anonymity and when giving interviews, often use 
pseudonyms and ask that particular details oftheir lives not be published. 
A number of North Koreans who attend religious services and activities in South 
Korea are not necessarily interested in the spiritual aspect of the congregation with which 
they are associated. There are sorne who have had contact with South Korean 
missionaries in China and have received help form these groups in their journey to South 
Korea and have felt readily converted to Christianity. There are sorne North Koreans who, 
although they may not harbour any spiritual feelings, participate in religious services 
more out of social obligation. They join the congregation as a form of respect and to 
express their appreciation for aU the help that they received from the religious group. 
Many North Koreans have high expectations of life in South Korea. When they 
realize that they must overcome even more obstacles than expected, sorne faU into a deep 
depression. It appears that psychological trauma is the main cause of the failure of 
saetomin integration. Those who enter South Korea with their families or who are married 
were found to have a happier life and to have more success in integrating. 1 t is a process 
that may take up to five years before the asylum seeker begins to feel at home. While the 
majority of asylum seekers remain in South Korea, there are an increasing number of 
them who have plans to move either to Europe or to the United States once they receive 
their South Korean passport. They believe that moving to a different country will help 
them to adjust to their new life with more ease and comfort, out of the constant watch of 
the South Korean government. 
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Sorne of the difficulties faced by saetomin in South Korea are those commonly 
experienced by other refugees and immigrants. However, the underlying difference is the 
high expectation of immediate integration from both the host society and the new arrivais. 
The ROK has embraced the saetomin as members of the Korean nation in the South. As 
suggested in their North Korean refugee policies, a 'successfully' integrated saetomin is 
one who has fully accepted to become part of the South Korean 'Self', (i.e.: to accept as 
their own, the South' s way of life, language, culture and history - all that is taught at 
Hanawon as their own). 
While the saetomin wish to feel as if they belong in South Korean society by 
adapting to a new lifestyle, they are not so readily willing to completely let go of their 
North Korean 'Other' that has been su ch an integral part oftheir life and oftheir identity. 
They are split between the desire to become a 'good South Korean citizen' and the wish 
to be able to return to their hometown. Difficulties of saetomin integration are due to 
unfulfilled expectations and on the diverging views of what it means to be Korean for 
South Koreans and for the saetomin. The constructed image of the Korean nation -
namely in South Korea- by the saetomin does not fit into the idea of the Korean 'Self, 
which is based on the lectures at Hanawon. As a result, the saetomin is a modified version 
of the South Korean 'Self, thus still remaining as the Korean other in their new home. 
Conclusion 
A united and homogeneous Korean national identity is an imagined entity 
constructed by those who long for a sense of peace and solidarity on the peninsula. 
Following the physical division of the Korean peninsula, which made the ideological 
differences more visible, efforts on the South Korean side of the DMZ have been made to 
construct a unified Korean identity, based on their respective images ofwhat and how 
Koreans should be. 
The quest for defining a unified conception of Korean nationalism is an ongoing 
process that will remain long after unification. This paper examined two complex and 
interrelated issues in Korean Studies: the question of Korean national identity and the 
integration process of North Korean asylum seekers in South Korea. Both questions are 
pivotaI in the development process of Korean society - not only in South Korea but for 
the peninsula as a whole. 
The main purpose was to examine the integration of the increasing numbers of 
saetomin arriving in the ROK since the 1990s, when devastating natural disasters and 
economic implosion in the DPRK had caused an exponential increase in the number of 
North Koreans to embark on the journey to the South. An analysis was made, keeping the 
thesis in mind: that the reason for the more recently arrived saetomin's difficulties in 
integration is due to the changing idea of Korean national identity in South Korea. More 
precisely, the differences between North and South Koreans are so great that South 
Koreans consider the Northerners to belong to a completely different group of Koreans, 
thus creating the image of separate North and South Korean nations in the Republic of 
Korea. The results show: despite an apparent divergence in South and North Korean 
societies, a strong sense of ethnie homogeneity still remains - particularly at the 
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government policy level. This belief in 'oneness' is the reason for which the South 
Korean governrnent has developed policies for asylum seekers in the South which give 
preference to those from the DPRK. Based on the clause in the ROK's constitution, which 
comprises a definition of a South Korean citizen that includes North Koreans, the South's 
policies may even be said to favour the idea of assimilation rather than i ntegration. 1 n the 
accounts of the saetomin interviewed, it seems that those who appeared more 'South 
Korean' experienced little or no discrimination for having come from North Korea. It is 
as though the desired saetomin is one who abandons their North Koreanness and blends 
into South Korean society. 
North Korean asylum seekers have existed since the division of the Korean 
peninsula in 1945. The number of North Koreans who make their way into South Korea 
has increased over the years and this trend is expected to continue. While the main reason 
for leaving the North is in search of a better, more comfortable life, the nature and 
catalyst for the increasing number of saetomin have also changed from political 
motivation to a situation of life and death. The NOlth Korean asylum seekers receive a 
generous bene fit package that other refugees and immigrants are not offered. The ROK 
government views the North Koreans as 'family' and, thus, feels that it's their dut y to 
provide and to take care ofthem. As mentioned in Chapter l, immigration and refugee 
policies are a relatively recent phenomenon in South Korea, for which the issue had not 
been seriously addressed until the past few years, under the Roh Mun Hyun 
administration. It still has much to do in terms of establishing basic laws and policies for 
immigration. The ROK has only recently acknowledged and accepted the presence of the 
Korean diaspora and has thereby been coping with the idea of many different forms of 
Korean 'nations', but which are still regarded as being members of one 'community' of 
Korean people. This change is evident in South Korea's amended immigration and 
citizenship policy. 
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As defined in Chapter II, Koreans' idea of the nation is based on a strong sense of 
ethnic homogeneity - one that is shared by both the North and South Korean governments. 
Despite the ideological differences, both the DPRK and the ROK maintain the finn belief 
in ethnic unit y as the basis for unification. The definition of Korean national identity is 
always changing and never has been very clearly defined. It has always been detined in 
response to externa1 threats. Shin refers to the formation of a collective consciousness for 
the purpose of self-preservation (Shin 2006, 225). 
Since the first inter-Korean summit in 2000, initiated by South Korean President 
Kim Dae Jung, the two Koreas have agreed to work towards an effort for peaceful co-
existence rather than for plans for immediate unification. Regardless of the political 
differences, this historical summit concluded with benefits of cultural and economic 
exchange between the two nations. It also recognized the social and cultural differences 
that have developed over the years, but maintained that these divergences are only a 
minor setback to the long history and that North and South Koreans àre still members of 
one Korean nation. According to Shin, the South Korean govemment is keen on 
preserving its native culture and values. As the disruption in social lives leads to 
affirmation of cultural and native heritage, Shin states that, "[ c ]hains of memory, myth, 
and symbol conne ct nations to their ethnic heritage, and national identity satisfies the 
people's need for cultural fulfillment, rootedness, security, and fraternity in the face of 
tumult." (Shin 2006, 214). 
As the threat of communism has decreased over the years and the Republic of 
Korea has become economically competitive on the world market to become more 
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politically stable, the government's 'unyielding' anti-communist and anti-North Korean 
policies have also softened. These changes are re!1eeted in the indicators of South Korean 
national identity, found in Chapter Three, in which the news media, primary school 
textbooks and national symbols were used to examine the image of the South Korean 
'Self' in relation to the North Korean 'Other'. 
The ROK government has had great influence (and in the past, control) over what 
and how its citizens felt about certain issues, particularly on their sentiments towards the 
DPRK and its people. To examine this influence, the following criteria were used: the 
print news media; school textbooks and national symbols, such as the Korean War 
Memorial and the joint Liberation Day celebrations with North and South Korea. The 
image portrayed had changed from one that demonized North Koreans to one of pit y 
because of their extreme poverty and lack of basic supplies, such as food and medicines. 
In keeping with the government's role in Confucian society, which is to serve as a 
'father figure', to teach and to protect its citizens from possible danger, the South Korean 
govemment has taken upon itself to assume this responsibility on behalf of aIl Koreans on 
the peninsula. Initially, by depicting the image ofthe evils of communism as having 
infiltrated the North Koreans, the South Korean govemment instilled an image of fear and, 
even, hatred. Today, while they are still regarded as a threat, North Koreans are portrayed 
as victims of communism who, thus, must be 'saved'. They are pitied for their difficult 
life, which is limited by restriction and poverty. In recent years, they are no longer given 
the image of 'subhuman', but are viewed as the poor brethren requiring its southem 
counterpart to care for and to support them; this is particularly evident since the 
devastating flood and famine of the 1990s, which led to a large exodus from the DPRK, 
as described in Chapter IV. 
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The North Korean asylum seekers assume that life in the South will not be 
difficult to adapt to because they have this idea of shared ethnicity. However, as it was 
shown in Chapter IV, ethnie homogeneity, based (.n a common bloodline, does not 
automatically imply easy integration. The difference in lifestyles and beliefs, which has 
increased a prolonged separation and isolation of the two states from each other, also has 
an effect. 
In Chapter V, it was noted that the problem of integration is not necessarily 
caused by the change in Korean national identity; instead, it is a result of the effect of 
lifestyle that cornes with capitalism and globalisation. Since the ROK has bec orne a 
member of the developing world, it has adapted to many of the ways oflife and 'culture' 
common in capitalist nations. Today, North Koreans who desire to leave South Korea 
c1aim that it is too difficult to live in the South; the y do not realise that moving to another 
country will not necessarily be any better. For many, the greatest barrier for saetomin is 
the psychological trauma experienced during their journey South and their unfulfilled 
expectations of adapting easily once they arrive. They are discouraged when their 
expectation of immediate success and integration are not fulfilled. They do not realise that 
this is a process that may take several years. 
Final Remarks 
Differences between North and South Korean societies are inevitable. These 
differences are acknowledged by both Korean governments; through cultural and 
economic exchange, they have made efforts to prevent further divergence, in accordance 
with their belief in a homogeneous Korean nation. The signs of divergence between the 
Koreas are directly experienced by the saetomin who live in the South. However, these 
differences are not so vast that a completely separate imagined North Korean nation 
within South Korea is present. 
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In terms of the South Korean 'self' and the North Korean 'other', the ROK's 
official policy is to embrace the North Korean asylum seekers as 'one oftheir own' (i.e.: 
South Korean citizens), as is stated in the country's constitution. As mentioned earlier, 
South Korea's government has taken the role of 'big brother', which is most prevalent in 
the changes made in school textbooks. There has been a movement from a sense of fear 
of North Koreans, to a feeling of pit Y and a beliefin the importance of unification, so that 
North Koreans can live as weIl as the South Koreans. The image has changed from the 
image of the 'evil' twin to one of the South Korean 'big brother' who cornes to the rescue. 
This is evident in the food and medical supplies that the South has sent to the North and 
more importantly, in projects such as the Kaesong lndustrial Complex and the Mount 
Geumgang tours, which are investments made by the South in order to help lessen the 
economic gap with the North. The goal, therefore, is to stimulate the DPRK economy. 
The policy goal of the ROK, with respect to the saetomin, is for integration and 
for eventual assimilation. However, sorne may argue that this may be difficult, not only 
because of the psychological and social problems encountered by the asylum seekers, but 
by the mere fact that the South Korean government continues to label them and to put 
them into a category that is separate from the general population. One may argue that the 
creation of the terms talbulga and saetomin, terms used when referring to North Korean 
asylum seekers, is an obstacle in the integration process. It may also be the reason why 
saetomin seem to have a strong separation from their 'self' and the South Korean 'other'. 
Grinker describes South Korean policy as one that [ails to "accommodate a changed and 
heterogeneous Korea" (Grinker 158, 1998 as in Shin 187). 
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Since the idea of Korean identity and the issues concerning the saetomin are 
always changing, more in depth studies are required in order to have a more 
comprehensive understanding of the subject, so that more effective programs can be 
developed. The research for this paper was conducted mainly through the study of the 
South Korean government's policies, rather th an through interviews and surveys, which 
would have provided a richer and deeper perspective on the situation of the ,melomin in 
South Korea. Due to several factors, such as limitations in time and resources and, more 
importantly, the sensitive nature of the research, this was not possible. Interviewing 
saetomin is a process that takes time and careful planning, since the interviewer must first 
build trust with the North Koreans and be able to make them feel at ease. 
The study of identity and saetomin integration, as presented in this paper, is a 
relatively recent issue and is of much interest to researchers and the governments 
involved. More detailed studies have begun only in the past ten years on the situation. 
National identity is a continuously changing phenomenon and is no different in Korea. 
However, the feelings of the Korean ethnic community, with respect to the North-South 
relations and Korean unification, are still strong (Shin 2006,234). Tt is this sense of the 
'imagined Korean community' that seeks to close the cultural and economic gaps 
between the DPRK and the ROK on the Korean peninsula and, especially, within South 
Korea and which, now, seems to account for the various policies set and implemented by 
the South Korean government. 
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Appendix 2 
Glossary of Tenns 
38th parallel The longitude at whieh the Koreali peninsula is divided. AJso referred 10 
as theDMZ. 
Durihana "two becomes one" - religious group based in South Korea with various 
programs to help North Korean asylum seekers. 
Gwangbok "great restoration" - term used to rder to Korean Liberation Day 
(August 15). 
Hanawon "longing for one" a facility run by the South Korean government 
required for North Korean asylurn seekers in South Korea to attend as 
a part of their settlement training. 
Hangeul The name of the Korean written language. 
Josorifok Term used to refer to ethnie Koreans living in China. 
Juche "self relianee" - the official ideology of North Korea created by Kim JI 
Sung, based on the principles of Marxist-Leninism. 
Minjok "race", "nation" term used by Koreans to refer to Korean nationalism 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
POW Prisoner ofwar 
Saetomin "new arrival"- the most recent term used to refer to North Korean asylum 
seekers. 
Talbukja "those who tled the North" - the term used to refer to North Korean 
asylum seekers before the term saetomin was created. 
